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INTRODUCTION
Scholars of fiduciary duties have divided themselves
into two warring camps. Contractualists maintain that
fiduciary duties are default terms the parties would have
negotiated if they had unlimited resources to devote to
bargaining.1 They claim that fiduciary duties are and
1. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAw 34 (1991) [hereinafter EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL,
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE] ("[Tihe fiduciary principle ... fills in the blanks and
oversights with the terms that people would have bargained for had they
anticipated the problems and been able to transact costlessly in advance.");
Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 209, 215
("Fiduciary duties are a type of contract term that applies, in the absence of a
contrary agreement, where an 'owner' who controls and derives the residual
benefit from property delegates open-ended management power over property
to a 'manager."'); Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary
Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 4 (1990)
("[W]e present a comprehensive response to prominent corporate law
commentators who have argued that private ordering of corporate manager
duties should be restricted by mandatory rules."); Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 427 (1993)
[hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract] (establishing contract theory of
fiduciary duties); J. Dennis Hynes, Freedom of Contract, Fiduciary Duties, and
Partnerships: The Bargain Principle and the Law of Agency, 54 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 439, 443 (1997) ("[T]he special status of fiduciary duties, as important as it
is, should be of a default nature only."); John H. Langbein, The Contractarian
Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 657 (1995) (contract theory of
fiduciary duty, with duty of loyalty performing a gap-filling role); Jonathan R.
Macey, Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to Nonshareholder
Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1266,
1273 (1999) ('[Fliduciary duties are the mechanism invented by the legal
system for filling in the unspecified terms of shareholders' contingent
[contracts]."' (quoting Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate
Shareholders: A Contractual Perspective, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 401, 407 (1993))).
FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS
should be a set of convenient background rules whose
substance is trumped by duties expressed in actual
contracts. Under this view, courts deciding fiduciary cases
adopt the methods of contract-implying terms and judging
behavior against those terms. A rival view holds that key
fiduciary duties are a set of externally-imposed rules
grounded in status-bedrock principles, many of which are
generally nonnegotiable. 2
Lack of consensus about the nature of fiduciary duties
has practical consequences. Courts must grapple with
whether all fiduciary duties are subject to contracting or
whether some are so important that they override the
parties' wishes. Can lawyers, trustees, or other fiduciaries,
for example, strike a deal with their principals waiving all
fiduciary duties? Other cases hinge on the breadth and
applicability of waivers designed to eliminate fiduciary
rules or limit liability for breach.3 The recent decision by
The Blackstone Group to sell limited partnership interests
through an initial public offering raises this question. In its
public filing, Blackstone discloses that the general partner,
who would normally owe fiduciary duties to the
partnership, shall have no duty or obligation-"fiduciary or
otherwise"-when given discretion to make decisions. 4
Enforceability of such a provision turns on the scope of
2. See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On Justifiable
Expectations of Loyalty and Their Consequences, 48 ARIz. L. REV. 925, 926
(2006) (explaining that loyalty is the "distinctive and unifying element of
fiduciary relationships"); Melanie B. Leslie, Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary Duties
and the Limits of Default Rules, 94 GEO. L.J. 67, 70 (2005) ("[L]abeling fiduciary
duties 'default rules' threatens to strip fiduciary rules of their moral content.");
Scott FitzGibbon, Fiduciary Relationships Are Not Contracts, 82 MARQ. L. REV.
303, 305 (1999) (arguing that fiduciary relationships "arise and function in
ways alien to contractualist thought"); Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as
Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209, 1246 (1995) ("[S]weeping waivers of
fiduciary duties that could undermine such a trust model should not be
enforced.").
3. See, e.g., Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 367 (Del. 2006) ("Such a provision
can exculpate directors from monetary liability for a breach of the duty of care,
but not for conduct that is not in good faith or a breach of the duty of loyalty.");
Worldspan, L.P. v. Sabre Group Holdings, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1358, 1360
(N.D. Ga. 1998) (invalidating waiver regarding dual representation in lawsuit
filed five years after consent was obtained).
4. The Blackstone Group L.P., Form S-1 Registration Statement Under the
Securities Act of 1933, at 46-47 (filed Mar. 22, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1393818/00010 474 6907002068/a2 17
6832zs-l.htm.
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fiduciary terms subject to private ordering. Similarly,
parties often quarrel over whether a detailed contract
contains all material terms or whether extra-contractual
duties can or should be imposed.5 In still other cases,
questions arise regarding whether fiduciaries can defend
their practices on efficiency grounds even if individual
parties are disadvantaged. 6
No one denies that many fiduciary duties are subject to
contract. The ability to vary fiduciary terms depends on
idiomatic state law, and some state legislatures, such as
Delaware, seek to give parties maximum freedom to
renegotiate fiduciary duties. 7 The ability to vary terms
depends also on the type of fiduciary relationship at issue.
Corporate and partnership law typically provide more
opportunities for waiver than other areas, like trust and
guardianship.
Even so, not all fiduciary duties are subject to
negotiation and waiver. A core fiduciary obligation exists
independent of these rights and responsibilities subject to
private ordering. Sometimes contractual limitations are
explicit, with courts and legislatures drawing a line in the
sand where the ability to negotiate fiduciary rules ends and
court-imposed rules begin. In other cases, the limitations
are hidden and take the form of requirements based on
good faith or similar formulations. The point is that even
5. See, e.g., City of Hope Nat'l Med. Ctr. v. Genentech, Inc., 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d
234, 238-39 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (affirming award of over $500 million with
regard to non-payment of royalties stemming in part from breach of fiduciary
duty notwithstanding detailed contractual terms and litigation of contract
claim), reh'g granted, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 178 (Cal. 2005).
6. See Jenny Anderson, Spitzer Sues UBS Over Its Fee-Based Brokerage
Accounts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2006, at C8.
7. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-103(f) (2005) ("A partnership agreement may
provide for the limitation or elimination of any and all liabilities for breach of
contract and breach of duties (including fiduciary duties) of a partner or other
person to a partnership ... provided, that a partnership agreement may not
limit or eliminate liability for any act or omission that constitutes a bad faith
violation of the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.");
see also GA. CODE ANN. § 14-9-108(b)(1) (2003) ("The partner's duties and
liabilities may be expanded, restricted, or eliminated by provisions in the
partnership agreement; provided, however, that no such provision shall
eliminate or limit the liability of a partner for intentional misconduct or a
knowing violation of law or for any transaction for which the partner received a
personal benefit in violation or breach of any provision of the partnership
agreement ... .").
FIDUCIAlR Y OBLIGATIONS
courts or legislatures that follow a strong contractual
tradition preserve a fiduciary core that cannot be altered.
Even the dyed-in-the-wool contractualists agree that some
aspects of the fiduciary duty are immutable.8
Any theory of the fiduciary relationship must account
for this irreducible core. How can we best describe the
fiduciary's primary obligation? Platitudes such as supreme
loyalty or heightened good faith need additional content to
be helpful, and phrases such as acting "for the benefit" or
"in the interest" of another are true for many non-fiduciary
relationships as well. In this Article, I seek to demonstrate
that the irreducible core of the fiduciary relationship is the
fiduciary's obligation to adopt the principal's goals, objectives,
or ends. Courts use many formulations to describe this duty
but in each case the core duty is the same.
The duty to adopt another's ends derives from
Immanuel Kant's moral philosophy and his discussion of
duties owed to others. A requirement to adopt another's
ends is an example of what Kant calls an imperfect duty,
which he contrasts with a perfect duty.9 Perfect duties are
narrow in scope; they are generally duties of omission, such
as prohibitions against improper conduct. 10 Imperfect
duties are open-ended; they are generalized duties to adopt
maxims or policies in furtherance of an objective or end.1
As I shall demonstrate, viewing the fiduciary duty as a duty
to adopt the principal's ends better explains leading
fiduciary cases than does the contractual account.
This Article has three Parts. Part I examines the
contractual approach, concluding that it is not a
comprehensive theory of the fiduciary relationship because
it is both over- and under-inclusive. Although a theory
8. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1436 (1989) (stating that corporate directors and
managers "may not contract out of the 'duty of loyalty").
9. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS *390-91 (Mary Gregor
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1797) [hereinafter KANT, METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS]; IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS *421
(Lewis White Beck trans.) [hereinafter KANT, FOUNDATIONS]; see also MARY J.
GREGOR, LAWS OF FREEDOM 95-112 (1963) (discussing and applying Kant's
distinction of perfect and imperfect duties). All page references to Kant's
writings are to the Academy Edition's pagination.
10. KANT, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 9 at *424-25.
11. Id. at *430.
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cannot explain every case, a robust theory should explain
the leading cases and the main tendencies in most. Leading
fiduciary cases, however, do not support the contractual
thesis. Part I also demonstrates that certain fiduciary rules
are nonnegotiable and concludes that contractualists
wrongly dismiss these rules as trivial. Part II provides an
alternative explanation of the core fiduciary obligation as a
duty to adopt the principal's objectives or ends based on
Kant's discussion of imperfect duties found primarily in his
Doctrine of Virtue, the second part of The Metaphysics of
Morals of 1797.12 The fiduciary duty is better viewed as a
duty to adopt the principal's ends. Part III applies the work
of Parts I and II. It demonstrates that leading cases,
including cases contractualists believe support their claim,
can better be described by a duty-based approach, not a
contractual one. Part III also explains why questions about
who is a fiduciary in the common law can best be answered
through a deontological lens, not the lens of contract.
I. THE CONTRACTUAL APPROACH
Fiduciary relationships are ubiquitous in the law. Some
fiduciary relationships, such as trustee and beneficiary,
lawyer and client, and partners in a partnership, arise in
the common law. 13 Other fiduciary relationships, such as
investment advisor and client, are creatures of statute.14
The law regarding who is a fiduciary is evolving. Majority
shareholders, for example, were first held to be fiduciaries
12. KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 9 at *373.
13. See, e.g., Ledbetter v. First State Bank & Trust Co., 85 F.3d 1537, 1539
(11th Cir. 1996) (trustees); Barker v. First Nat'l Bank, 20 F. Supp. 185, 186
(N.D. Ala. 1937) (trustees); Venier v. Forbes, 25 N.W.2d 704, 708 (Minn. 1946)
(partners); Meyer v. Maus, 626 N.W.2d 281, 286 (N.D. 2001) (attorneys);
Stephenson v. LeBoeuf, 16 S.W.3d 829, 836 (Tex. App. 2000) (attorneys);
Salhinger v. Salhinger, 105 P. 236, 237 (Wash. 1909) (partners); see also John
C. Coffee, Jr., From Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on the Criminalization of
Fiduciary Breaches and the Problematic Line Between Law and Ethics, 19 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 117, 150 (1981) (stating that common law fiduciary includes
executors, guardians, trustees, attorneys, and directors); Austin W. Scott, The
Fiduciary Principle, 37 CAL. L. REV. 539, 541 (1949) (stating that fiduciaries
include trustees, guardians, agents, attorneys, executors, and partners).
14. SEC v. Capital Gains Res. Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194-95 (1963)
(noting that Congress recognized advisors to be fiduciaries in the Investment
Advisers Act).
104 [Vol. 56
2008] FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 105
in the early part of the twentieth century. 15 And the advent
of some fiduciary relationships depends on the particular
facts surrounding the relationship. Physicians are considered
fiduciaries in some cases but not others;' 6 even spouses can
owe fiduciary duties to one another depending on the
circumstances.' 7
Courts have differing views with respect to when
fiduciary duties arise. Some look to reliance by the principal
and dominance or control by the fiduciary as evidence of a
fiduciary relationship.' 8 Others look to trust and confidence
on the part of the principal matched with influence or
superiority by the fiduciary.' 9 In all cases, a fiduciary owes
a duty of loyalty to act loyally in the principal's interest and
15. S. Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 492 (1919) ("It is the fact of control of
the common property held and exercised [by majority shareholders], not the
particular means by which or manner in which the control is exercised, that
creates the fiduciary obligation.").
16. See Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 626-27 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating HMO
must disclose financial incentives affecting patient's decision to accept his
physician's advice); Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483
(Cal. 1990) (stating physician must obtain patient's informed consent and
disclose personal interests that may affect medical judgment); see also Mary
Anne Bobinski, Autonomy and Privacy: Protecting Patients From Their
Physicians, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 291, 347-56 (1994) (stating that a physician's
fiduciary duty must be determined on a case-by-case basis).
17. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991) ("Although
spouses certainly may by their conduct become fiduciaries, the marriage
relationship alone does not impose fiduciary status."); Francois v. Francois, 599
F.2d 1286, 1292 (3d Cir. 1979) (stating marital relation does not automatically
give rise to fiduciary relationship, rather each relationship must be separately
analyzed).
18. See, e.g., Oil & Gas Ventures-First 1958 Fund Ltd. v. Kung, 250 F.
Supp. 744, 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (stating fiduciary relationship can be founded on
dominance, which is determined on all facts).
19. See eToll, Inc. v. Elias/Savion Adver., Inc., 811 A.2d 10, 23 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2002) ("[T]he critical question [in determining the existence of a fiduciary
relationship] is whether the relationship goes beyond mere reliance on superior
skill, and into a relationship characterized by 'overmastering influence' on one
side or 'weakness, dependence, or trust, justifiably reposed' on the other side."
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Basile v. H & R Block, Inc., 777 A.2d 95, 101 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2001), rev'd, 926 A.2d 493 (2007)); Chestman, 947 F.2d at 569
(stating fiduciary relationship is characterized by trust and confidentiality);
Barbara A. v. John G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 432 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) ("The
essence of a fiduciary or confidential relationship is that the parties do not deal
on equal terms, because the person in whom trust and confidence is reposed and
who accepts that trust and confidence is in a superior position to exert unique
influence over the dependent party.").
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a duty of care to undertake reasonable actions on the
principal's behalf.20 Several scholars of fiduciary law have
attempted to construct a unified theory of fiduciary duties, 21
some viewing them as including mandatory duties that
cannot be altered by contract, 22 others viewing them as
contractual. 23
The contractual analysis of fiduciary duties is both
positive and normative. 24 The positive aspect is that
fiduciary duties, as espoused by judges and legislatures, are
contractual in nature. Scholars writing in the positive
tradition look at the law "as is" and explain how we got
here. The normative aspect is advocacy-arguing and
explaining to judges, legislatures, and others why they
should adopt a contractual model when deciding fiduciary
cases or writing fiduciary rules. My emphasis is primarily
on the positive aspect and Part I demonstrates that the
contractual approach does not adequately explain fiduciary
duties as a positive matter and forces one to look elsewhere.
20. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. e (2006) ("As a general
matter, the term 'fiduciary' signifies that an agent must act loyally in the
principal's interest as well as on the principal's behalf."); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959) (stating that under fiduciary duty of loyalty,
trustee must act solely in the interest of the beneficiary); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 193 cmt. a (1981) ("A fiduciary is expected to refrain
from acting for his private advantage or otherwise contrary to the interests of
his beneficiary or principal in matters affecting the fiduciary relation .... ).
21. See, e.g., DeMott, supra note 2 (arguing that fiduciary duty exists when
one party can justifiably expect loyalty from another); J. C. Shepherd, Towards
A Unified Concept of Fiduciary Relationships, 97 L.Q. REV. 51, 75 (1981) ("A
fiduciary relationship exists whenever any person receives a power of any type
on condition that he also receive with it a duty to utilise [sic] that power in the
best interests of another, and the recipient of the power uses that power."); D.
Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV.
1399, 1402 (2002) (posing a unified fiduciary duty theory based on whether an
actor "acts on behalf of another party . . . while exercising discretion with
respect to a critical resource belonging to the beneficiary" (emphasis omitted)).
22. See supra note 2.
23. See supra note 1.
24. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 1, at vii
("Most of [this book] is an exercise in positive economics--that is, we take the
world and its laws as given and try to understand why they are as they are.");
David Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate
Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 1378 (1993) ("The contractarian view thus
rests on a descriptive assessment of current possibilities, as well as a normative
vision of the limited role that law should play ... ").
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A. The Contractual Approach to Fiduciary Duties
According to the contractual model, fiduciary duties arise
from high costs of contract specification and monitoring.25
For some types of contracts-long-term complex contracts
that entail broad discretion-it is costly to specify all
possible conditions and the resultant obligations. Instead,
contracting parties perform a cost-benefit analysis; if the
benefit of negotiating additional terms is not worth the cost,
the contract remains silent. Contractualists maintain that
in such cases, the fiduciary and principal rely on default
rules that can be renegotiated at any time. Duties of loyalty
and care are enabling, suppletory, or negotiable rules that
the parties would have chosen if they had unlimited
resources to bargain. 26  What is important about
understanding fiduciary duties is the way they are
articulated-as waiveable default terms.
The norm underlying the contractual approach is
wealth-maximization. 27  If the parties had unlimited
25. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract, supra note 1, at 427 ("[A] 'fiduciary'
relation is a contractual one characterized by unusually high costs of
specification and monitoring."); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE,
supra note 1, at 90 ("If contracts can be written in enough detail, there is no
need for 'fiduciary' duties as well."); Butler & Ribstein, supra note 1, at 30
(stating that fiduciary duties are closely related to explicit contract terms
because parties cannot specify the entire contract in their promise); Langbein,
supra note 1, at 657-58 (applying Easterbrook and Fischel's model of fiduciary
duties arising from high costs of contract specification and monitoring to trust
law).
26. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 90-91 (1989) (providing
taxonomy for contractual approach to fiduciary duties).
27. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract, supra note 1, at 426 ("Because
the process is contractual-because both principal and agent enter this
understanding for gain-the details [of terms such as 'duty of loyalty'] should be
those that maximize that gain, which the contracting parties can divide."); id. at
446 ("[W]hen transaction costs are too high, courts establish the presumptive
rules that maximize the parties' joint welfare."). Wealth maximization is the
Kaldor-Hicks concept of efficiency, also called potential Pareto superiority. A
reallocation of resources is efficient if the resulting increase in wealth is
sufficient to compensate the loser so that, after compensation, he is no worse off
than he was before the reallocation. (The compensation need not actually take
place.) The other common concept of efficiency is Pareto superiority-one state
of affairs is Pareto superior to another if at least one person is made better off
and no one is made worse off. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND
ECONOMICS 19 n.2 (2002) (differentiating Pareto superiority and Kaldor-Hicks
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
resources to bargain, they would agree on contractual terms
to maximize their wealth. Thus, if the parties fail to specify
terms, it makes sense for courts to impose terms mirroring
what the parties would have negotiated had they thought
about it. Courts assign rights and responsibilities to the
parties who, absent transaction costs, would have acquired
them through contract, thereby promoting efficiency.
For support, contractualists point to the fundamental
tenet of trust law that a trustee cannot sell trust property
to himself, which contractualists maintain is itself an
enabling rule. 28 The Restatement of Trusts, for example,
provides that an express provision in a trust document
trumps the duty of loyalty. 29 Elsewhere, the Restatement
says that insofar as the trust terms allow, a trustee can sell
trust property to himself individually or, as trustee, he can
purchase property from himself individually, or otherwise
deal in trust property. 30 The American Law Institute
extended this principle in the most recent draft of the
Restatement. A comment to new section 78, Duty of
Loyalty, provides: "[E]ven the vital fiduciary duty of loyalty
is a default rule that may be modified by the terms of the
trust."3
1
Contractual scholars also point to fiduciary duties in
corporate law to support the thesis. A corporation is
considered a nexus of contracts between and among
shareholders, creditors, suppliers, managers, directors, and
others. All parties negotiate their respective positions and
the deal struck by shareholders is to provide equity capital
in exchange for becoming residual claimants. Non-share-
holder parties have fixed claims and are protected through
contracting. After the fixed claims have been paid,
shareholders are entitled to what remains; they bear the
risk of failure but reap the rewards of success and have the
strongest interest in the company's profitability. Share-
holders, however, are unable to negotiate a detailed
contract to require the optimal level of risk-taking.
efficiency).
28. Langbein, supra note 1, at 636, 659.
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 222 (1959).
30. Id. § 170(1) cmt. t.
31. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. c(2) (Tentative Draft No. 4,
Apr. 5, 2005).
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Fiduciary duties, therefore, fill the gap requiring managers
and directors to act in the interest of shareholders as
opposed to other claimants.32
Under the contractual model, corporate fiduciary duties
are said to be enabling, not mandatory. Jonathan Macey
argues that the primary features of corporate law-limited
liability, legal personhood, indefinite life, and free
transferability of shares-can be amended by contract. 33
Rules governing corporate opportunities and conflicts of
interest are said to be negotiable as well.34 Some have
pointed to the adoption of state statutes permitting
corporations to amend their charters and allow directors to
opt out of the duty of care. 35 Section 102(b)(7) of the
Delaware General Corporation Law, for example, allows a
corporation to limit personal liability of directors for
breaches of the duty of care. 36 Managers are said to have
flexibility in other areas too. If they do not like the law in
one state, they can reincorporate in another. If the federal
securities laws are too onerous, companies can go private,
limiting or eliminating many disclosure obligations. If the
very nature of the corporate form is a problem, managers
can convert to a partnership or limited liability company.37
Viewing fiduciary duties as implied contractual terms
suggests there is nothing unique or special about them.
Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel state that fiduciary
duties just mirror the bargain the parties would have
32. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 1, at 68
(explaining that shareholders elect directors, who may act in their interest,
because shareholders are the residual claimants of the firm and have the best
incentives to make appropriate discretionary decisions).
33. Macey, supra note 1, at 1270; see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL,
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 1, at 11-12.
34. Macey, supra note 1, at 1278-79.
35. See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate
Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1012 (1997) (stating that section 102(b)(7)
"allows Delaware corporations to opt out of director liability for breach of the
duty of care"); Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty
of Care Standard in Corporate Governance, 75 IOwA L. REV. 1, 7 (1989)
("[S]ection 102(b)(7) ... allowed firms to 'opt' out of the strengthened duty of
care standard .... ").
36. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).
37. See Macey, supra note 1, at 1271.
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reached had they been able to bargain for free.3 8 According
to Easterbrook and Fischel, fiduciary rules are socially
optimal penalties that enable the parties to capture the
benefits obtained by delegating authority to the fiduciary
while at the same time constraining the fiduciary from
furthering its own interests as opposed to the principal's
interests. 39 Fiduciary duties as implied contractual terms,
however, should not override express contractual terms. 40
B. Limitations of the Contractual Approach
The contractual account is incomplete. The contractual
account is not a robust explanatory model for fiduciary
relationships because it is both over- and under-inclusive. It
is over-inclusive because certain relationships are
characterized by high costs of specification and monitoring,
but no fiduciary duties arise. The model is under-inclusive
because in many cases, the parties draft a detailed
agreement, yet courts find that fiduciary duties arise
irrespective of the contract. A good example, discussed
below, is Meinhard v. Salmon.41 This section also addresses
the contractual claim that mandatory fiduciary terms either
do not exist or are trivial. I examine the duties of trustees
and corporate officers to demonstrate that such mandatory
terms are important and significant.
1. The Over- and Under-Inclusive Critique. Contract
cannot explain when fiduciary relationships arise. Under
the contractual model, fiduciary duties should appear
where the parties face high costs of contract specification
and monitoring. This claim is over-inclusive, however,
38. Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract, supra note 1, at 427.
39. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions,
91 YALE L.J. 698, 702 (1982).
40. Id. at 703 n.15. Easterbrook and Fischel make the statement that
fiduciary duties have no moral foundation-they are just like other contractual
undertakings. Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract, supra note 1, at 427. This
statement is puzzling because the contractual approach, designed to promote
wealth, is justified by a consequentialist moral philosophy. RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 16 (6th. ed. 2003) (tying Kaldor-Hicks efficiency
(wealth maximization) to utilitarianism). The primary rival to
consequentialism, deontology, however, supports a rival view of the fiduciary
obligation. See infra Part II.
41. 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
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because many relationships are marked by high costs of
contract specification and monitoring, but fiduciary duties
are absent. Securities brokerage is an example. Brokerage
customers typically sign an account opening agreement
where specification of terms is difficult. Most customers are
unlikely to understand, let alone specify, the agreement
regarding the clearing broker used to execute and clear
transactions, custodial services, or calls for additional
collateral. Costs of monitoring are similarly high. Brokers
historically were paid a commission for each transaction
executed but they were criticized for "churning" customer
accounts-engaging in excessive trading for the sole
purpose of generating commission dollars.42 Notwithstanding
high costs of specification and monitoring, brokers generally
are not considered fiduciaries to their customers. 43
42. See Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 820 (9th Cir. 1980)
(stating that in cases of churning, customer may hold broker liable under Rule
10b-5 under the Securities Exchange Act).
43. Although exceptions exist, in most jurisdictions, absent special
circumstances, the stockbroker-customer relationship is not a fiduciary
relationship. See, e.g., Indep. Order of Foresters v. Donald, Lufkin & Jenrette,
Inc., 157 F.3d 933, 940 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that under state law, "there is no
general fiduciary duty inherent in an ordinary broker/customer relationship");
Associated Randall Bank v. Griffin, Kubik, Stephens & Thompson, Inc., 3 F.3d
208, 212 (7th Cir. 1994) ("A broker-dealer in Wisconsin is not a fiduciary with
respect to accounts over which the customer has the final say ...."); Hotmar v.
Lowell H. Listrom & Co., 808 F.2d 1384, 1387 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that
under Kansas law, existence of fiduciary duty depends on the facts); Romano v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 834 F.2d 523, 530 (5th Cir. 1987)
(stating that the nature of fiduciary duty depends on the facts and that no
fiduciary duty exists where the client was sophisticated and controlled the
account); Lefkowitz v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 804 F.2d 154, 155
(1st Cir. 1986) ("[A] simple stockbroker-customer relationship does not
constitute a fiduciary relationship in Massachusetts."); Leboce, S.A. v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 709 F.2d 605, 607 (9th Cir. 1983)
(imposing, under California law, a fiduciary duty on broker when it, "'for all
practical purposes,"' controls the investment account (quoting Twomey v.
Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 69 Cal. Rptr. 222, 240 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968)));
Marchese v. Nelson, 809 F. Supp. 880, 891 n.18 (D. Utah 1993) (stating that
under Utah law, a broker over a non-discretionary account is not a fiduciary);
Patsos v. First Albany Corp., 741 N.E.2d 841, 850-51 (Mass. 2001) (stating that
whether a fiduciary relationship exists between broker and client depends on
the lack of investment acumen of the client); McCracken v. Conticommodity
Servs., Inc., 755 P.2d 454, 456 (Colo. App. 1988) (stating that a customer must
prove the broker has "practical control" of his account to establish a fiduciary
relationship (quoting Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtins, Inc. v. Adams, 718
P.2d 508, 517 (Colo. 1986))). But see Marchese v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc.,
734 F.2d 414, 418 (9th Cir. 1984) ("As a securities broker and commodities
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Audit services are another example. A fully specified
audit engagement letter could contain hundreds or
thousands of detailed terms. Instead, engagement letters
typically focus on objectives, responsibility of management,
and fees. The shift to principles-based accounting introduces
more ambiguity into the relationship. 44 Allocation of risk in
the event of misconduct is typically omitted and, when such
terms appear, enforceability is uncertain. 45 Monitoring is
costly as well. Historically, shareholders faced difficulties
monitoring audit firms because of concerns about their
independence from company management. Unbeknownst to
shareholders, auditors would give a clean bill of health to
management in the face of management's implicit threat to
terminate non-audit related business performed by another
part of the audit firm.46 Despite high costs of specification
and monitoring, an auditor is not a fiduciary to an audit
client.47
futures commission merchant, Shearson stood in a fiduciary relationship with
Marchese."); In re Scheuer, 125 B.R. 584, 592 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991) (imposing
fiduciary duty on stockbrokers under California law).
44. See Rebecca Toppe Shortridge & Mark Myring, Defining Principles-
Based Accounting Standards, CPA JOURNAL, Aug. 2004, at 34, 36 ("Many
accountants seem to prefer rules-based standards, possibly because of their
concerns about the potential of litigation over their exercise of judgment in the
absence of bright-line rules."); Letter of Robert H. Miles, Senior Vice President
and Controller, Washington Mutual Bank, to Ms. Suzanne Q. Bielstein,
Financial Accounting Standards Board, Jan. 2, 2002, available at
http://www.fasb.org/ocl/1125-001/14021.pdf (explaining that principles-based
accounting would lead to interpretive guidance developed "behind closed
doors").
45. Indemnification or limitations on the auditor's liability could impair
independence. Eric L. Talley, Cataclysmic Liability Risk Among Big Four
Auditors, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1642 (2006); William D. Sherman, Audit
Engagement Letters May Affect Auditor Independence, Morrison & Foerster,
Legal Updates & News (Mar. 2006), http://www.mofo.com/news/updates/
files/update02163.html.
46. See, e.g., Strengthening the Commission's Requirements Regarding
Auditor Independence, Securities Act Release No. 8183, Exchange Act Release
No. 47,265, Public Utility Holding Co. Act Release No. 27,642, Investment Co.
Act Release No. 25,915, 68 Fed. Reg. 6006 (proposed Feb. 5, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8183.htm; John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper
Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L.
REV. 301, 322 (2004) (discussing auditors' failure to stop aggressive accounting
policies).
47. See, e.g., VTech Holdings Ltd. v. Pricewaterhouse Coopers LLP, 348 F.
Supp. 2d 255, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("[T]he accountant-client relationship does
not generally give rise to a fiduciary relationship .... ); KPMG Peat Marwick v.
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The contractual approach is also under-inclusive
because it does not account for the many relationships
where high costs of specification and monitoring are absent
or surmountable, yet fiduciary duties arise. If the
contractualists were right, courts would not uphold a
fiduciary relationship where parties negotiate detailed
agreements. 48 Actual terms, contractualists argue, should
trump implied terms every time. 49 Leading cases in agency,
partnership, and other areas of fiduciary law, however, hold
that one's status as an agent or partner depends not on
terms the parties negotiated but rather on the court's
objective view of the relationship. 50 Courts uphold fiduciary
duties even where the parties negotiate detailed contracts
and, in some cases, try to expressly disclaim fiduciary
duties.51 Courts uphold a breach of fiduciary duty claim,
and even award punitive damages derived from tort, while
dismissing or ignoring contract claims. 52
Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 765 So. 2d 36, 38 (Fla. 2000) (distinguishing
independent auditor's function from an advocate with undivided duty of loyalty
owed to a client).
48. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 1, at 90
(explaining that well written contracts obviate the need for fiduciary duties); see
also Cook Biotech Inc. v. ACell, Inc., No. 03-CV-0046, 2005 WL 1473892, at *7
(N.D. Ind. June 21, 2005) (discussing the "well-established rule that contractual
agreements do not give rise to a fiduciary duty").
49. Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract, supra note 1, at 427.
50. Southex Exhibitions, Inc. v. R.I. Builders Ass'n, 279 F.3d 94, 102 (1st
Cir. 2002) ("[T]he labels the parties assign to their intended legal relationship,
while probative of partnership formation, are not necessarily dispositive ....");
Martin v. Peyton, 158 N.E. 77, 79 (N.Y. 1927) ("[A]lthough they provide that
they shall not be liable for any losses or treated as partners, the question still
remains whether in fact they agree to so associate themselves with the firm as
to 'carry on as co-owners a business for profit."'); Murphy v. Holiday Inns, Inc.,
219 S.E.2d 874, 876 (Va. 1975) ("When an agreement, considered as a whole,
establishes an agency relationship, the parties cannot effectively disclaim it by
formal 'consent'.").
51. See, e.g., Victory Lane Prod., LLC v. Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker,
LLP, 409 F. Supp. 2d 773, 781 (S.D. Miss. 2006); Global Entm't, Inc. v. N.Y. Tel.
Co., No. 00-CV-02959, 2000 WL 1672327, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2000) (stating
that fiduciary duties exist "separate and beyond any contractual duties");
Singleton v. Stegall, 580 So. 2d 1242, 1244 (Miss. 1991) (separating duty to
comply with valid contract from duties of loyalty and care); April Enterp., Inc. v.
KTTV, 195 Cal. Rptr. 421, 428 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) ("[T]he conduct of the
parties may create a joint venture despite an express declaration to the
contrary.").
52. See, e.g., City of Hope Nat'l Med. Ctr. v. Genentech, Inc., 20 Cal. Rptr.
3d 234, 265 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
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Underwriters of initial public offerings (IPOs), for
example, can owe a fiduciary duty to an issuer,
notwithstanding contrary contractual language between the
underwriter and the issuer. In one case, underwriters
allegedly under-priced securities sold in an offering in
return for payments from the purchasers. Notwithstanding
a negotiated contract between the parties, the court upheld
the lead managing underwriter's extra-contractual fiduciary
duty. The underwriter maintained that a relationship
between an issuer and an underwriter is "an arms-length
commercial relation from which fiduciary duties do not
arise." The court, however, stated:
It may well be true that the underwriting contract, in which
Goldman Sachs agreed to buy shares and resell them, did not in
itself create any fiduciary duty. However, a cause of action for
breach of fiduciary duty may survive, for pleading purposes, where
the complaining party sets forth allegations that, apart from the
terms of the contract, the underwriter and issuer created a
relationship of higher trust than would arise from the
underwriting agreement alone. 5 3
This court looked beyond the agreed terms for evidence of a
fiduciary relationship. One cannot say the parties were
unable to specify contractual terms because they did so. If
fiduciary duties were wholly contractual, such extra-
contractual fiduciary claims would not survive.
Consider Justice Cardozo's opinion in Meinhard v.
Salmon.54 Contractualists argue that Meinhard can be best
described through implied contractual terms.55 A close look
at Cardozo's disquisition and the underlying court record,
however, demonstrates that Cardozo was not hobbled by
the shackles of contract-he disregarded the parties'
agreement and imposed extra-contractual fiduciary duties
instead. In Meinhard, Walter Salmon leased the Hotel
Bristol in New York City from Louisa Gerry for twenty
years. Meinhard, the plaintiff, provided half the funds
needed to renovate and operate the property, and Meinhard
and Salmon divided responsibilities, profits, and losses.
Four months before the end of the lease, Elbridge Gerry,
53. EBC I, Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 832 N.E.2d 26, 31 (N.Y. 2005).
54. 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
55. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract, supra note 1, at 439-40.
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the new owner, renewed the lease with Salmon but Salmon
did not mention the renewal to Meinhard. When Meinhard
found out, he insisted the new lease be held in trust as an
asset of the joint venture between Salmon and himself.
Cardozo ruled for Meinhard. He held that Salmon, as a co-
adventurer with Meinhard, was a fiduciary just like a
partner, and Salmon could not appropriate the new lease in
secrecy. Cardozo allotted Meinhard just under half of the
value of the new lease.56
Contractualists argue that both the majority and
dissent use a "contract-forcing" approach to resolve the
case.57 They maintain that Cardozo speculated that had
Elbridge Gerry known Meinhard was a silent partner,
Gerry would have offered the deal to Meinhard as well as
Salmon, and Meinhard perhaps could have purchased an
interest for himself or even out-bid Salmon.58 By allowing
Meinhard to purchase a partial interest in the new lease,
the court "created the contract" the parties would have
negotiated absent transaction costs. 5 9
This analysis, however, is inconsistent with the
contractual principle that actual terms trump implied
terms. In Meinhard, the parties negotiated and drafted a
detailed agreement, which prescribed their rights and
responsibilities and limited them to twenty years. The
agreement stated:
[I:] [Salmon] hereby agrees to contribute and pay to [Meinhard],
for and during the period of twenty (20) years from the first day of
May, 1902, Fifty per centum of any and all moneys necessary to
reconstruct, alter, manage and operate the Bristol Hotel property,
at Fifth Avenue and Forty-second Street, leased to [Salmon] by
Louisa M. Gerry, for a period of twenty (20) years from the first
day of May, 1902 ....
II: [Salmon] hereby agrees to pay to [Meinhard] for and during
the period commencing on the first day of May, 1902, and ending
on the first day of May, 1907, Forty per centum of the net profits
arising out of the said Bristol Hotel property, leased to him as
aforesaid, and thereafter, i. e., [Salmon] agrees to pay to
56. Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 546-49.
57. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract, supra note 1, at 440.
58. Id. at 439-40.
59. Id. at 440.
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[Meinhard] for the remaining fifteen (15) years of the term of the
said lease, provided such lease shall not be sooner terminated, a
sum equal to Fifty per centum of the net profits arising or growing
out of the said leased premises, after deducting operating and
managing expenses. 60
III: It is agreed between the parties hereto that each of the
parties shall bear equally the losses, if any, arising or growing out
of the aforesaid lease or the premises embraced therein, for and
during the full term of said lease, i. e., from the first day of May,
1902, to the first day of May, 1922 ....
IV: It is further understood and agreed that this instrument
shall not in any way effect the management and operation of the
said Bristol Hotel property, but on the contrary [Salmon] shall
have full power to manage, lease, underlet and operate the said
premises ....
It is understood in the event of the death of [Salmon] at any
time before the terminatoin [sic] of this agreement, that no
disposition shall be made of the lease hereinbefore referred to,
without first consulting [Meinhard]. And should the personal
representatives of [Salmon] decide to dispose of said lease to other
parties for the term remaining, or to surrender the same to the
lessor, it is agreed that said lease shall be offered, prior to such
disposition or surrender, to [Meinhard], upon the same terms and
conditions as said representatives intend to dispose of or to
surrender the same, and he shall have the right of taking said
lease for such unexpired term, upon said conditions.
And in the event of the death of [Salmon] as aforesaid, it is
understood that his personal representatives will and shall consult
with [Meinhard], provided he is living, as to the management and
operation of the said leased premises. 6 1
Under the terms of this agreement, Meinhard agreed
for a twenty-year period to pay fifty percent of the expenses
associated with the Bristol; Salmon agreed to pay Meinhard
forty percent of net profits for the first five years of their
agreement (later changed to six) and fifty percent for the
60. Shortly after the agreement was signed, the parties revised this
paragraph so that Meinhard received forty percent of net profits for the first six
years, not five, and fifty percent for the remaining fourteen years, not fifteen
years. Plaintiffs Exhibit 5 at 4,468, Meinhard v. Salmon 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y.
1928) (on file with author).
61. Plaintiffs Exhibit 3, Memorandum of Agreement at 4,441, Meinhard v.
Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928) (on file with author).
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remainder. Losses were to be split equally. Salmon was to
have managerial responsibilities. The parties even specified
Meinhard's future rights. If Salmon died before the lease
expired, no disposition could be made of the lease without
first consulting Meinhard. If Salmon's personal
representatives decided to sell the lease to other persons or
surrender it to Gerry, they were required to offer the lease
to Meinhard on the same terms, and Meinhard had the
right to take over the lease for the unexpired term. The
agreement also provided the circumstances when Meinhard
would be consulted about the management of the property.
The agreement stated that the instrument would not affect
the management and operation of the property and left
control in Salmon's hands.62 Only upon Salmon's death
would his personal representatives consult Meinhard about
the management and operations of the leased premises.6 3
A response might be that notwithstanding some
detailed terms, Salmon and Meinhard did not agree about
the eventuality that occurred here, namely when a renewal
is offered to one party but not the other. The agreement,
however, set forth the circumstances when Meinhard would
have future rights regarding the property and a renewal
was not included. More importantly, their responsibilities
were to last only for a twenty-year period provided the lease
was not terminated sooner.64
For the contractualists' account to be correct, they
would have to claim that Cardozo was effectively writing
the contract for the next twenty years. If that is the claim,
however, Cardozo would be imposing a set of mandatory
terms on the parties to last for the next twenty years. If two
parties enter into a garden-variety contract for the first to
perform a service for the second for twenty years, neither
can require the other to continue to perform at the end of
the term-the contract length was previously decided and
specified. Courts only imply terms with respect to duration
62. Id. at 4,444-46.
63. Id. at 4,448-50.
64. Id. at 4,444; see also Geoffrey P. Miller, Meinhard v. Salmon 14 (N.Y.
Univ. Law & Econ. Working Papers, Paper No. 105, 2007), available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu/lewp/papers/105 ("The contract between Meinhard and
Salmon clearly contemplated an arrangement limited by the term of the
original lease.").
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where the contract is either silent or ambiguous.6 5 Here,
however, the term was express. Cardozo stepped outside of
the contract and continued the obligation beyond the stated
term. The actual terms did not give Meinhard the right to
participate in a future arrangement.
Cardozo writes that Salmon probably thought that
since the term of the venture was drawing to a close,
Salmon could ignore Meinhard and take the next
opportunity for himself. Cardozo even goes so far to say that
Salmon would be right if the two were competitors. 66
Cardozo, however, shuns a contractual approach. Putting
all of Cardozo's language about honor aside,67 look at what
he says: Meinhard had already been paid well under the
agreement and insisting on more appears greedy.68 Thus,
the contract itself would militate against Meinhard
prevailing. Cardozo, however, rejects a contractual
approach, refusing to treat the parties as competitors who
negotiate a contract and must live and die by its terms.6 9
Meinhard demonstrates the under-inclusivity of the
contractual thesis. The parties negotiated a detailed
contract, which excluded rights sought by the plaintiff.
Notwithstanding the terms, Cardozo placed additional
fiduciary duties on Salmon. This interpretation of the
opinion debunks the contractual thesis put forth in a
65. See, e.g., Guilbert v. Gardner, 480 F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir. 2007) ("Where a
contract does not specify a date or time for performance, New York law implies
a reasonable time period."); Barco Urban Renewal Corp. v. Hous. Auth. of
Atlantic City, 674 F.2d 1001, 1007 (3d Cir. 1982) ("When parties to a contract in
a commercial setting fail to specify terms that are essential to a determination
of their respective legal obligations, courts imply the omitted terms."); see also 1
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 424 (3d ed. 2004) ("Where
no time is specified for performance of a duty such as that to deliver goods or
pay the price, courts have had little difficulty in supplying a term requiring
performance within a 'reasonable' time.").
66. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 548 (N.Y. 1928).
67. Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 546 ("A trustee is held to something stricter than
the morals of the marketplace. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor
the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.").
68. See Miller, supra note 64, at 15 ("The equities favored Salmon.
Meinhard, as Cardozo recognized, had already been richly rewarded for his
initial investment, substantially due to Salmon's capable management.
Meinhard had done nothing other than cash checks.").
69. Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 548 (stating that the standard normally applying
to competitors has no "pertinency" in the case).
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leading article by Easterbrook and Fischel that perhaps the
leading fiduciary duty case is a closet contractual decision.70
Mandatory terms, such as those Cardozo placed on Salmon,
are pervasive in fiduciary law and, as the next section
shows, they cannot be dismissed as unimportant or trivial.
2. Mandatory Terms as Important and Significant.
That courts, such as Meinhard, view fiduciary duties
separately from contractual duties is itself evidence that
such duties are mandatory and not enabling-they are
externally imposed duties grounded in status, not in the
interstices of contract. The Restatement of Torts states that
principles applying to fiduciaries derive not from the
contract or agreement between the parties, but rather from
the parties' relation.71 In this section, I respond to examples
used to demonstrate the negotiable nature of fiduciary
rules, focusing on trustees and corporate managers and
directors.
a. Trustees. A trustee is generally prohibited from
personally dealing in trust property. The Restatement of
Trusts, discussed above, provides that rules barring the
trustee from transacting with trust property can be
waived.72 John Langbein argues that virtually all of trust
law consists of default rules that parties can alter in the
trust agreement. 73  The relevant provision of the
Restatement-section 222-however, does not state or
imply that the trustee's duty of loyalty is negotiable; it
simply permits exculpation in certain circumstances. The
section states that "the trustee, by provisions in the terms
of the trust, can be relieved of liability for breach of trust."74
The Restatement goes on to distinguish between an
exculpatory provision, such as section 222, and a provision
limiting a trustee's duties.75 The difference is important. An
70. Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract, supra note 1, at 438-40.
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 cmt. b (1979).
72. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
73. Langbein, supra note 1, at 636, 659.
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 222(1) (1959).
75. Section 222 provides in part as follows:
(2) A provision in the trust instrument is not effective to relieve the
trustee of liability for breach of trust committed in bad faith or
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exculpatory clause is a contractual provision relieving a
party from certain liability resulting from a wrongful act. 76
It is similar to an exemption clause, which provides that a
party will not be liable for damages for which the party
would otherwise be liable absent the agreed term.7 7 It
operates like a release-an agreement to relinquish or
abandon an existing claim. 78 It is not the same as a
limitation on, or waiver of, a requirement to perform a duty.
Moreover, section 222 is not a complete exculpatory
provision. First, it does not relieve a trustee of liability for
profits derived from a breach.79 Under section 222, if a
trustee competes with a beneficiary and profits, the trustee
may not retain the profits. Second, the parties may not
insert terms that would permit the trustee to ignore the
beneficiary's interests.8 0 One purpose of a trust is to
establish the trustee's duty to attend to the beneficiary's
interests; a complete exculpatory clause would render the
intentionally or with reckless indifference to the interest of the
beneficiary, or of liability for any profit which the trustee has derived
from a breach of trust.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 222(2) (1959). The comments to subsection
(2) distinguish explicitly between exculpation and limitation of duty:
c. Distinction between exculpatory provisions and those limiting
trustee's duties. If by the terms of the trust it is provided that the
trustee shall not be under any duty to do or to refrain from doing an act
which but for such provision it would be the duty of the trustee to do or
refrain from doing, the trustee does not commit a breach of trust in
doing or failing to do the act, unless such provision is ineffective as
contrary to public policy. If, however, the trustee is not relieved of such
a duty either because there is no provision to that effect in the terms of
the trust or because such provision is ineffective as against public
policy, a provision in the terms of the trust that the trustee shall not be
liable for breach of trust is against public policy to the extent stated in
Comment b.
Id. § 222(2) cmt. c.
76. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 588 (7th ed. 1999).
77. See id. at 593; P. S. ATIYAH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT
167 (3d ed. 1981).
78. See SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 73:1
(Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 2003).
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 222(2) (1959); see also id. § 222(2)
cmt. b.
80. Id. § 222(2) cmt. b (stating that no exculpatory clause applies for a
breach committed with "reckless indifference to the interest of the beneficiary").
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trustee unaccountable for his actions.81 According to George
G. Bogert, author of a leading treatise on the law of trusts,
an exculpatory clause providing that the trustee is
accountable to no one is not enforceable.8 2 Consistent with
the idea of a fiduciary core, courts note a "point beyond
which" the parties cannot relieve a trustee from liability for
breach of duty.8 3 Section 222, therefore, does not provide
that the parties can contract around the duty, only around
personal liability for certain aspects of a breach.
Other provisions in the Restatement permitting the
parties to revise trust terms are also limited in scope. A
comment to section 174, for example, states that the
requirement of "care and skill" may be "relaxed or
modified. '8 4 It does not allow one to eliminate the duty of
care, nor does it address the fiduciary duty of loyalty.8 5 A
comment to section 170 states that trust terms can
empower a trustee to sell trust property to himself. The
trustee, however, violates his duty if he acts in bad faith
regardless of how broad the trust terms are drafted.8 6 The
most recent draft of the Restatement backs away from a
wholly contractual view. A comment to section 78, Duty of
Loyalty, states:
Even an express authorization [to engage in prohibited
transactions], however, would not completely dispense with the
trustee's underlying fiduciary obligations to act in the interest of
the beneficiaries and to exercise prudence in administering the
trust. Accordingly, no matter how broad the provisions of a trust
may be in conferring power to engage in self-dealing or other
transactions involving a conflict of fiduciary and personal
interests, a trustee violates the duty of loyalty to the beneficiaries
by acting in bad faith or unfairly.8 7
The drafters say that the comment quoted above
81. See In re Green Charitable Trust, 431 N.W.2d 492, 499 (Mich. Ct. App.
1988).
82. GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES § 542 at 188 (rev. 2d ed. 1993).
83. See Browning v. Fidelity Trust Co., 250 F. 321, 325 (3d Cir. 1918).
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 cmt. d (1959).
85. Id.
86. Id. § 170 cmt. t.
87. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. c(2) (2007).
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recognizes that the duty of loyalty entails more than default
law: "[T]here are limits to the settlor's freedom, thereby
protecting the fundamental fiduciary character of trust
relationships recognized by law. 8 8 This reference is doubly
important because it preserves an irreducible fiduciary
core-the "fundamental fiduciary character"-and because
it ties limitations on contractual freedom to the fundamental
character of the relationship. The fundamental fiduciary
character, in other words, is non-negotiable.
The fiduciary core in trust law is emphasized in the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of
1974.89 Relying on Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch,90
contractualists state that ERISA authorizes the use of
trustees, who are appointed by management and may
operate under a conflict of interest, acting simultaneously
as fiduciaries to the plan and the corporation, which would
be "unpardonable" under trust law.91 As a result, the
argument goes, ERISA's legislative scheme, as opposed to
the common law of trusts, is contractual because an
employer can appoint trustees, who may operate under a
conflict and still receive broad discretion to interpret and
apply the plan.
Firestone, however, does not expressly allow or advocate
contractual freedom; to the contrary, Firestone is about
when a court will exercise control over fiduciary
decisionmaking. According to Firestone, a trust instrument
can vary the trustees' discretion to construe terms and,
88. Id.
89. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-
1461 (2006).
90. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
91. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract, supra note 1, at 430. See generally
Paul M. Secunda, Inherent Attorney Conflicts of Interest under ERISA: Using
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct to Discourage Joint Representation of
Dual Role Fiduciaries, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 721, 730-32 (2006) (discussing
conflicting dual role of ERISA fiduciaries). It is an exaggeration to say that
conflicts are "unpardonable" in the law of trusts. A settlor can authorize a
trustee to act in a dual capacity. Where a conflict of interest is permitted, a
fiduciary will not be liable for his conduct unless he acts dishonestly, in bad
faith, or abuses his discretion. See, e.g., Dick v. Peoples Mid-Ill. Corp., 609
N.E.2d 997, 1002 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) ("Where a conflict of interest is approved
or created by the testator, the fiduciary will not be held liable for his conduct
unless the fiduciary has acted dishonestly or in bad faith, or has abused his
discretion.").
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when a trustee is given discretion, a deferential standard of
review of arbitrary and capricious is appropriate. 92 The
deferential standard of review, however, is subject to
control by the courts to prevent abuse by the trustee,93 and
one factor in determining whether abuse of discretion has
occurred is whether the administrator or fiduciary is
operating under a conflict of interest.94 Thus, although the
plan can allow for a conflict of interest by plan
administrators, which is often inherent in their dual role, a
conflict of interest gives rise to a stricter standard of review
of their conduct.
Moreover, ERISA contains many nonnegotiable
provisions, which demonstrate the mandatory nature of
that particular legislative scheme. ERISA's exclusive
benefit rule provides that an ERISA fiduciary shall
discharge his duties "solely in the interest" of plan
participants and for the "exclusive purpose" of providing
them with benefits. 95 Another provision clarifies that plan
assets "shall never inure" to the employer.96 ERISA departs
from the common law of trusts by voiding any provision
purporting to "relieve a fiduciary from responsibility or
liability."97 Courts hold that contracts alleviating fiduciaries
from performing their fiduciary responsibilities are
invalid98 and commenters note that ERISA "transforms
92. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115.
93. See id. at 111 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1959)).
94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. d (1959) (stating that
in determining "whether the trustee is guilty of an abuse of discretion" one
relevant circumstance is "the existence or nonexistence of an interest in the
trustee conflicting with that of the beneficiaries"), quoted in Firestone, 489 U.S.
at 115. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to resolve the issues of (1)
whether a claim administrator that also funds an ERISA plan leads to a conflict
of interest that must be weighed in a determination of judicial review, and (2)
how such a conflict, if it exists, should be addressed on judicial review of a
discretionary benefit determination. See Glenn v. Metlife, 461 F.3d 660 (6th Cir.
2006), cert. granted, No. 06-923, 2008 WL 161473 (Jan. 18, 2008).
95. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §
1104(a)(1)(A) (2000).
96. Id. § 1103(c)(1).
97. Id. § 1110(a).
98. See Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc.,
472 U.S. 559, 568 (1985) ("[T]rust documents cannot excuse trustees from their
duties under ERISA. . . ."); IT Corp. v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 107 F.3d 1415,
1418 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[A] contract exonerating an ERISA fiduciary from
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default law into mandatory law."99
Contractualists could respond that even if fiduciary
rules are mandatory, they stand in for the parties'
agreement and are efficient because the parties would not
pursue an agreement that does not maximize joint wealth.
Fiduciary rules, however, are often highly inefficient
because they limit the parties from engaging in the private
ordering essential to contractual relationships. 100 In trust
law, the fiduciary must abstain from transacting with his
principal even when the fiduciary places a higher value
than other potential bidders on trust assets and is willing to
outbid the competition. 0 1 The Restatement of Trusts says
that a trustee, who bids for the purchase of trust property
for his own account may not keep the property even if he
secured as many bidders as possible and his bid was fair. 0 2
John Langbein observes that the sole benefit rule of trust
law is "value impairing."'103 The same is true in other areas
of the law too numerous to review here. 104 Thus, although
fiduciary responsibilities is void . ").
99. JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT
LAw 682 (3d ed. 2000).
100. See TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY: AMERICA'S BUSINESS CULTURE
AT A CROSSROAD 123 (2006); id. at 149 ("[F]iduciary rules are inefficient because
they severely limit the fiduciaries' freedoms to engage in tempting (but not
fraudulent) transactions.").
101. See, e.g., Magruder v. Drury, 235 U.S. 106, 120 (1914) ("It makes no
difference that the estate was not a loser in the transaction .... ); Hartman v.
Hartle, 122 A. 615 (N.J. Ch. 1923) (finding that a trustee or spouse cannot
purchase trust property from himself and must disgorge profits even when fair
value was paid).
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 cmt. b (1959) ("A trustee with
power to sell trust property is under a duty not to sell to himself either by
private sale or at auction, whether the property has a market price or not, and
whether or not the trustee makes a profit thereby. It is immaterial that the
trustee acts in good faith in purchasing trust property for himself, and that he
pays a fair consideration."). As discussed, the exculpatory clause provision in
section 222 provides that an exculpatory provision is not effective to relieve the
trustee of liability for profit the trustee derives from a breach of trust. Id. §
222(2).
103. John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest
or Best Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 929, 952 (2005).
104. The classic example in partnership law is Marsh v. Gentry, 642 S.W.2d
574 (Ky. 1982). John Marsh and Tom Gentry formed a partnership to buy and
sell thoroughbreds. Id. at 575. Without telling Marsh, Gentry offered to
purchase Champagne Woman and Excitable Lady through a third person. The
court refused to uphold the sales stating that partners must act with a high
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courts may arrive at default contractual terms, these terms
are not necessarily efficient, nor are they meant to be.
b. Corporate Officers and Directors. Contractualists
maintain that corporate law in general and corporate
fiduciary duties in particular supply terms that the parties
would have negotiated given unlimited resources. Central
to the claim is that the default terms merely supplement,
but do not replace, actual terms negotiated by the parties.
The few instances when the default rules are mandatory,
they say, are unimportant to the daily life of the firm.1 0 5 As
an example of this model in action, contractualists point to
provisions in corporate law, such as section 102(b)(7) of the
Delaware code, which permits charter amendments limiting
the duty of care. 106 Robert Clark observes that a corporation
can ask its shareholders to vote to "opt out" of the common
degree of good faith. Id. at 576. The relevant Kentucky statute provided that a
partner must account for any benefit derived from a transaction connected with
the partnership unless consent was obtained. A partner has a right to know
when his partner is the buyer. Id. Marsh claimed he would not have consented
to the sale had he known Gentry was the purchaser. The dissent, however,
noted that the partnership as a whole would have been better off as a result of
Gentry's purchase. Id. at 578 (Stephenson, J., dissenting). The bidding for
Champagne Woman halted at $60,000 except for Gentry's agent, who bid
$135,000. The dissent explained that Marsh was better off with Gentry as
purchaser than if the horse were sold for $60,000. Id.
We can surmise from the bidding that Gentry valued Champagne Woman at
$135,000 or more ($75,000 over the next highest bid). In retrospect, one can ask
whether Marsh would have accepted a payment between $1 and $75,000 to
allow Gentry to bid anonymously for the thoroughbreds. It is impossible,
however, to second-guess what actual bargain the parties would have struck.
Perhaps they would have agreed that a partner may never purchase
partnership property absent advance disclosure. Or perhaps they would have
agreed either partner could do so in the ordinary course and at arm's length, as
Gentry did here. Perhaps they would have struck a deal where one partner
could bid anonymously for partnership assets but only if the bid were
sufficiently high to provide a premium for non-disclosure. Ascertaining what the
parties would have bargained for in a costless market is difficult. See Jules
Coleman, The Normative Basis of Economic Analysis: A Critical Review of
Richard Posner's The Economics of Justice, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1109 n.6
(1982) (book review). Regardless, Gentry's fiduciary obligation precluded an
efficiency analysis advocated by the dissent and frustrated a transaction that
enhanced value to both parties.
105. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 1, at 3,
34.
106. See supra note 35 and accompanying text; Butler & Ribstein, supra
note 1, at 4; Macey, supra note 1, at 1271-72.
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law rules of fiduciary duty.10 7
Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware code, however, does
not permit a general "opt out" of the duty of care. It permits
limited exculpation with respect to one remedy-personal
liability for money damages-where there has been a
breach of the duty of care by directors. 108 Like exculpation
in trust law, section 102(b)(7) was not intended to negate
the director's duty, but rather to remove liability for
personal damages. According to the official commentary of
the Delaware legislature, the provision has no effect on
equitable remedies for breach of fiduciary duty, such as
actions for an injunction or rescission 0 9 and it does not
exculpate directors from duties of disclosure. 110 Moreover,
recent developments in Delaware suggest that section
102(b)(7) will not exculpate directors from many traditional
duty of care claims because courts have begun to place such
claims under the category of loyalty, not care, and a breach
of the duty of loyalty is not subject to exculpation."'
Contractualists also argue that fiduciary duties are
negotiable because managers can change corporate form
and shed their responsibilities. They can reincorporate in
another state, for example, or take a company private or
107. Robert C. Clark, Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the Making of
Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1703, 1704 (1989).
108. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and
the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1791
n.150 (2001) (rejecting characterization that section 102(b)(7) permits opting
out of duty of care).
109. S. 533, 133d D. Gen. Assembly 2, 5 Del. Laws, ch. 289, §§ 1-2 (1986)
(commentary to section 102(b)(7)), quoted in 1 EDWARD P. WELCH, ANDREW J.
TUREZYN & ROBERT S. SAUNDERS, FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION
LAW § 102.15.1 at GCL-I-28 to -29 (5th ed. 2007); see also Robert P. McKinney,
Protecting Corporate Directors and Officers: Indemnification, 40 VAND. L. REV.
737, 759 (1987).
110. See Zirn v. VLI Corp., 621 A.2d 773, 783 (Del. 1993) ("[T]he legislative
history of the statute authorizing this provision ... indicates that corporations
are empowered to shield directors from breaches of the duty of care, not the
duty of loyalty, which also embraces the duty of disclosure .... ).
111. See, e.g., Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369-70 (Del. 2006) (finding that
oversight liability is a violation of the duty of loyalty, not care); Guttman v.
Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 (Del. Ch. 2003) (finding that a traditional duty of care
claim now requires a showing that directors breached their duty of loyalty by
neglecting to fulfill duties in good faith).
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convert to a partnership or limited liability company. 112
Bernard Black calls this strategy "avoidance" and says it is
one reason mandatory rules in corporate law are trivial.113
As a practical matter, it is not so easy to change
corporate form. 1 4 But even if managers have the ability to
change corporate form, such flexibility does not render
fiduciary rules enabling. A motorist can decide to walk or
ride a bicycle rather than drive, but that does not make our
traffic laws and driving rules any less mandatory.
Similarly, the rules of tennis are mandatory-a ball that
falls behind the baseline is out. The rules become no less
mandatory because the players forgo a game of tennis and
play squash instead. To say investors can vote with their
feet, or firms can reincorporate in another state or opt for a
governance structure with a different set of mandatory
rules, does not make the rules themselves enabling.
The law of insider trading is a variation on this theme.
Corporate insiders and other fiduciaries that possess
material, non-public information must either disclose the
information or abstain from trading." 5 Some argue that in
deciding insider trading cases, courts take a contractual
approach, such as imputation of terms, in determining who
owns non-public information-a form of property-and,
112. See Macey, supra note 1, at 1271; supra text accompanying note 37.
113. Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic
Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 542, 555-61 (1990).
114. See Miller v. Ross, No. 600986-06, 2007 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 637, at *12
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 6, 2007) (nullifying conversion of New York limited
partnership to Delaware LLC absent consent of majority of each class of limited
partners); Berger v. Scharf, 816 N.Y.S.2d 693 (unpublished table decision), No.
600935-2005, 2006 WL 825171, at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 29, 2006) ("A plaintiff
states a valid claim under Delaware law for breach of fiduciary duty by alleging
particular facts showing that the directors decided to delist for self-interested
reasons .... "); see also Termination of a Foreign Private Issuer's Registration of
a Class of Securities Under Section 12(g) and Duty to File Reports under
Section 13(a) or 15(d), Exchange Act Release No. 34-55005, 72 Fed. Reg. 1384
(Jan. 11, 2007) (describing the "burdens and uncertainties associated with
terminating registration and reporting under the Exchange Act").
115. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968)
("[A]nyone in possession of material inside information must either disclose it to
the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in order to protect a
corporate confidence, or he chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading in or
recommending the securities concerned while such inside information remains
undisclosed.").
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therefore, when liability arises. 116 The laws governing
insider trading, in other words, just help write the
corporate contract that would be negotiated between
directors, managers, employees, and others, if given
unlimited resources. Cases cited to support this proposition,
however, suggest the opposite. The law of fiduciary duties
propounded in insider trading cases is extra-contractual
law imposed on the parties.
Take the example of SEC v. Cherif.117 Cherif is a
misappropriation case decided by the Seventh Circuit
before the Supreme Court endorsed the misappropriation
theory in United States v. O'Hagan.118 The defendant,
Danny Cherif, worked at First National Bank of Chicago
until he was terminated in 1987. Using his identification
card, which he kept under false pretenses, Cherif was able
to enter the office of his previous employer and obtain
confidential information about upcoming transactions.
Based on the information, he traded and profited from the
trades. 119 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
sued on the misappropriation theory of insider trading.
Under the misappropriation theory, liability arises
when a person breaches a fiduciary duty to any lawful
possessor of material, non-public information-not just the
corporation itself or its shareholders. 120 Cherif argued that
the misappropriation theory was not applicable because no
fiduciary duty existed between him and First National
Bank after 1987 when his employment terminated.' 21
116. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract, supra note 1, at 440.
117. 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991), cited in Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract,
supra note 1, at 440 n.36.
118. 521 U.S. 642, 655 (1997). Under the classical theory of insider trading,
a corporate insider trades on the basis of material non-public information in
breach of a duty of trust and confidence between the insiders and the
shareholders. Under the misappropriation theory, a person, not necessarily a
company insider, misappropriates confidential information to trade securities in
breach of a duty owed to the source of the information. Instead of basing
liability on a fiduciary relationship between the insider and the shareholder
who buys or sells, liability under the misappropriation theory is based on
deceiving those who entrusted the trader with non-public information. See id. at
652.
119. Cherif, 933 F.2d at 406.
120. See id. at 409.
121. Id. at 408.
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Cherif maintained that an integrity policy he signed
prevented him from using information he obtained only
while on the job and that the restrictions terminated with
his employment.122  The court, however, avoided a
contractual approach to determining whether he had a duty
not to trade stating: "Notwithstanding the contractual
agreement, Cherif was bound by a broader common law
duty."'123 The court opted to enforce a general principle
preventing former employees from disclosing non-public
information, regardless of contractual terms. In Part III, I
return to the topic of insider trading and argue that a
property approach grows out of a prior duty owed between
the parties and not out of ownership principles themselves.
In summary, the contractual model cannot fully explain
fiduciary rules. The model is both over- and under-inclusive
and it fails to address a fiduciary core that is not negotiable.
The duty of loyalty precludes the fiduciary from engaging in
precisely the type of conduct that contractualists
advocate. 124 If the contractual model is incomplete, what
explains the core fiduciary obligation, which is not subject
to negotiation? The next Part demonstrates that the core
fiduciary duty is a duty to adopt the principal's goals,
objectives, or ends.
II. THE ADOPTION OF ENDS
In this Part, I sketch a view of the fiduciary obligation
that better explains the central tendency of fiduciary cases.
This view is based not on efficiency concerns, but rather on
the idea of duty itself, which entails a commitment by the
fiduciary to adopt the principal's objectives, goals, or ends
as the fiduciary's own and to promote those ends. The
emphasis on duty places this view within deontological
moral theory. Deontology asks whether an act is required,
permitted, or prohibited by a moral duty irrespective of, or
at least not wholly dependent upon, the overall consequences
attached to the act. 125 One common conception of deontology
122. Id. at 411.
123. Id.
124. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust. Contract. Process., in PROGRESSIVE
CORPORATE LAw 185, 187-93 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995).
125. STEPHEN DARWALL, PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS 81 (1998) (explaining that
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is one's moral duties must be understood in connection with
agent-relative maxims that require, permit, or prohibit
particular acts, and violating those maxims is morally
wrong. 126 The ends do not necessarily justify the means.
This deontological conception of duty is what lies at the
heart of the fiduciary relationship. The fiduciary's adoption
of the principal's objectives or ends, regardless of the overall
consequences of doing so, is the unifying theme in fiduciary
cases. It is what makes fiduciary law unique and separates
fiduciaries from other service providers.
This Part first explains that the core duty of the
fiduciary is to adopt the ends of the principal and act to
promote those ends. It then discusses how the Restatement
of Agency conceptualizes the fiduciary duty in this manner.
Next, this Part explains that the duty to adopt another's
end is grounded in Kant's system of duties. The duty to
adopt an end is a duty of ethics-and an imperfect duty-in
Kant's system. This Part ends by noting that courts
deciding fiduciary cases examine the fiduciary's motive for
acting or not acting and try to determine whether the
fiduciary was inspired to promote the ends of the principal
or to promote some other-inappropriate--objective.
A. Pursuing the Principal's Ends
I begin by identifying formulations of the core fiduciary
obligation that cannot be eliminated by the parties through
contract. Let's look at some examples. The Uniform
Partnership Act (UPA) provides that, although partners can
identify particular activities that may not violate the duty
of loyalty, they cannot renegotiate the duty of loyalty or
unreasonably reduce the duty of care. 127 In defining the
content of the duty of loyalty, the UPA provides that a
partner must "account to the partnership" and "hold as
trustee" for the partnership any benefit the partner derives
from the conduct of the partnership business or use of
deontology, unlike consequentialism, holds that "there are right- and wrong-
making considerations other than good and bad effects"); SHELLY KAGAN,
NORMATIVE ETHICS 73 (1998) (explaining that deontology presupposes
"constraints, which erect moral barriers to the promotion of the good").
126. See, e.g., Heidi M. Hurd, The Deontology of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. REV.
249, 253 (1996); J. L. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG 149 (1990).
127. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 103(b), 6 U.L.A. 73 (1997).
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partnership property, including the taking of a business
opportunity. 128 The comment to the UPA states that these
provisions are intended to protect a "fundamental core" of
the fiduciary obligation that cannot be eliminated by
contract. 129
Similarly, the Restatement of Trusts provides that the
trustee is under a duty to administer a trust "solely in the
interest of the beneficiary."'130 Recall that the Restatement
of Trusts, quoted above, provides that even if the parties
had agreed to an express authorization, the authorization
"would not completely dispense" with an underlying
fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of the beneficiaries
(the duty of loyalty) and exercise prudence in
administration of the trust (duty of care).131 The ERISA
statute, as discussed above, goes further. An ERISA
fiduciary must act solely in the interest of the participants
and for the exclusive purpose of their benefit. 13 2
1. The Fiduciary's Role. What does it mean to act for
the benefit or in the interest of the principal? Don't all
service providers act for another's benefit? 133 Although
fiduciary relationships often are considered agency
relationships, a fiduciary is a special type of agent. Agency
is defined in the Restatement of Agency as consent by the
principal that the agent act on the principal's behalf and
subject to the principal's control, and the agent agrees to so
act.13 4  Historically, determining whether an agency
relationship existed turned on the agent's lack of autonomy.
The principal's control of the agent resulted in an agency
relationship; lack of control militated against agency and in
favor of some other type of relationship, like an independent
contractor.135 Fiduciaries are different. Although the
principal has nominal control over the agent at the outset of
the relationship, the control dynamic is reversed; when
performing its function, the fiduciary exercises control over
the assets or affairs of the principal. 136 The principal may
128. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404(b), 6 U.L.A. 143 (1997).
129. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 103(b) cmt. 4, 6 U.L.A. 74 (1997).
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) (1959).
131. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. c(2) (2007); see also supra
text accompanying note 87.
132. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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decide whether to enter the relationship in the first place,
but the relationship is not co-equal; the fiduciary obtains
control over the principal. To create a valid trust, for
example, the settlor must transfer sufficient authority and
discretion to the trustee and the beneficiary's interest must
vest at the time of transfer. 137 Thus, the fiduciary has
power over the principal and, at the same time, must act for
the principal's benefit.
Given the infinite number of actions available for the
fiduciary to pursue, how does he determine what actions
will benefit the principal? The answer is the fiduciary must
become aware of the principal's subjective purposes,
objectives, or ends and adopt the principal's ends as the
fiduciary's own ends. When a person has an end, we expect
the person to be sensitive to facts associated with the end
133. See Lionel Smith, The Motive, Not the Deed, in RATIONALIZING
PROPERTY, EQUITY AND TRUSTS: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF EDWARD BURN 53, 64
(Joshua Getzler ed., 2003) ("It is not uncommon for one person to have a
positive duty to advance the interests of another. If I make a contractual
promise to you that I will put a new roof on your house, I have a positive duty to
advance your interests.").
134. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958).
135. See Hoover v. Sun Oil Co., 212 A.2d 214, 216 (Del. Super. Ct. 1965)
(denying agency relationship because "Sun had no control over the [details] of
Barone's day-to-day operation"); Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Martin, 222
S.W.2d 995, 998 (Tex. 1949) (finding an agency relationship because of
"evidence bearing on the right or power of Humble to control the details of the
station work").
136. See, e.g., United States v. Skelly, 442 F.3d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting
that "reliance and de facto control and dominance"' are necessary for a
fiduciary relationship (quoting United States v. Szur, 289 F.3d 200, 210 (2d Cir.
2002))); Hi-Ho Tower, Inc. v. Com-Tronics, Inc., 761 A.2d 1268, 1280 (Conn.
2000) (stating that "control, dominance or influence [is] characteristic of
fiduciary relationships"); see also Mitchell, supra note 124, at 188-89
(differentiating fiduciary relationships from other economic and legal
relationships by discretion vested in fiduciary and lack of control on part of
principal).
137. Although the settlor can reserve income from the trust estate for
himself, as well as the right to revise the trust or even disapprove of
investments, the interest of the trust must pass to the trustee. See Denver Nat'l
Bank v. Von Brecht, 322 P.2d 667, 672 (Colo. 1958) ("Where, as here, the
property involved in a trust is assigned, transferred and set over to the trustee
and remains in the name of the trustee, the interest of the settlor therein
passes to the trustee in presenti ...."); In re Estate of Groesbeck, 935 P.2d
1255, 1258 (Utah 1997) (upholding trust where legal title passed to trustees
although settlors reserved power to access trust assets without formal
authorization of trustee).
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and to the subtle ways to promote it.138 This sensitivity
separates fiduciaries from other service providers.
Although most service providers pursue an objective or
goal of benefiting a consumer, the task of most service
providers is discrete, such as repairing, installing, building,
or paving. If the task is not completed, these service
providers have not done their job. Fiduciary services are
different; they entail a series of open-ended actions over
time. Such actions are not expected to be perfect or correct
in all cases; they are scrutinized under a "range of
reasonableness" test. 139 Lawyers, for example, can lose
many of their cases and still practice consistently with their
fiduciary obligations. Although winning a client's case is the
goal, winning is not essential to performing the lawyer's
task the way a successful repair is essential to the
repairman's task. Particularly under the adversarial
system, it would be uncommon for an attorney to win every
case and courts recognize that a lawyer is not a guarantor
of results.140
The fiduciary's role is more subtle than completing a
particular task. The fiduciary's knowledge and skill lead to
role identification with the principal. 141 Fiduciaries often
act in the name and place of the principal. 142 They receive
and analyze information and make difficult judgments
about whether and how to respond. 43 Although many
professionals undertake to act on another's behalf, the
138. See Christine Korsgaard, Morality as Freedom, in KANT'S PRACTICAL
PHILOSOPHY RECONSIDERED 23, 44 (Yirmiyahu Yovel ed., 1989).
139. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 931 (Del. 2003).
140. See Helmbrecht v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 362 N.W.2d 118, 130-31 (Wis.
1985) (stating that attorney is not a "guarantor" of results for client);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52 cmt. b (2000)
(stating that the duty of competence does not make a lawyer a guarantor of a
successful outcome).
141. See Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55
N.Y.U. L. REV. 63, 77 (1980) ("[A]t the invitation of the client, the lawyer
becomes an extension of the legal, and to an extent the moral, personality of the
client.").
142. A typical power of attorney authorizes another to act "[i]n my name,
place and stead, in any way which I myself could do, if I were personally
present" with respect to certain matters. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1501
(McKinney 2007).
143. See Postema, supra note 141, at 76.
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fiduciary's agency is deeper. When the fiduciary speaks,
argues, negotiates, and transacts, he does so in his client's
name to further the client's ends, and binds the client to a
determinate future.144
The fiduciary's role identification with the principal
requires him to reorient his moral viewpoint away from
pursuing the overall best state of affairs to furthering
agent-relative objectives. Just like spouses, parents, and
friends prefer the interests of those closest to them over
others, fiduciaries must use their expertise to promote their
principals' ends over the ends of others and be indifferent to
overall consequences that would normally bear upon one's
behavior. 145 John Pomeroy, in his famous treatise, Equity
Jurisprudence, explained that when analyzing whether a
transaction with a fiduciary constitutes a breach of
fiduciary duty, it makes no difference if the sale was fair,
full consideration was paid, or the price was the highest
that could be obtained. 146 The Supreme Court long ago
overturned the purchase of property for sale at a public
auction by two executors of a will even though the price was
fair. 147 Similarly, a trustee who transacts in trust property
for his or her own account cannot defend a breach of duty
claim by maintaining that the price was fair and the
transaction did not cause harm.148
Some courts formulate the fiduciary obligation as a
duty to treat the principal as the fiduciary would treat
144. See Deborah A. DeMott, Disloyal Agents, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1049, 1051
(2007) ("[A]n agent acts with power to affect the principal's legal relations by
creating rights or obligations applicable to the principal or by acquiring
knowledge of facts with which the principal is charged. The central idea is that
an agent serves a representative function and does not simply provide a
service.").
145. See Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral
Issues, 5 HuM. RTS. 1, 5 (1975).
146. 3 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 958
(Spencer W. Symonds ed., 5th ed. 1941) (explaining that the "policy of equity is
to remove every possible temptation from the trustee").
147. See Michoud v. Girod, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 503, 555 (1846) ("The disability
to purchase is a consequence of that relation between them which imposes on
the one a duty to protect the interest of the other, from the faithful discharge of
which duty his own personal interest may withdraw him.").
148. See Hartman v. Hartle, 122 A. 615 (N.J. Ch. 1923); supra notes 101-03
and accompanying text.
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himself.149 Some even use the phrase "alter ego" to
reference the fiduciary norm. 150 This personalizes the duty
in a particular way. The fiduciary must appropriate the
objectives, goals, or ends of another and then act on the
basis of what the fiduciary believes will accomplish them-
a happy marriage of the principal's ends and the fiduciary's
expertise. The fiduciary does not eliminate its own legal
personality, rather it must consider the principal's
delegation of authority to the fiduciary from the perspective
of fidelity to the principal's objectives as the fiduciary
understands them. According to the Restatement of Agency,
the fiduciary has the obligation to consider the principal's
delegation of authority, or any instruction by the principal
to the fiduciary, and to interpret the delegation or
instruction "so as to infer, in a reasonable manner, what the
principal would wish the agent to do in light of the facts of
which the agent has notice at the time of acting." 51 The
next section expands on the fiduciary obligation as a
process of interpreting the principal's instructions.
2. The Adoption of Ends as a Rule of Interpretation. The
Restatement of Agency conceptualizes the fiduciary duty as
the duty to adopt the principal's ends, articulating the duty
in terms of the fiduciary's interpretation of the principal's
directive. 152 As mentioned, fiduciary relationships, like
other agency relationships, entail consent by the principal
that the fiduciary will act on the principal's behalf and
subject to the principal's control. 153 These essential
requirements for agency presuppose that the principal will
instruct the agent on how to act. At the time the fiduciary
acts, therefore, it will be required to interpret language the
principal uses in its instructions or otherwise assess the
149. In Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1992), Judge Posner wrote:
"A fiduciary duty is the duty of an agent to treat his principal with the utmost
candor, rectitude, care, loyalty, and good faith-in fact to treat the principal as
well as the agent would treat himself." Id. at 1381.
150. See United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 168 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The
essence of a fiduciary relationship is that the fiduciary agrees to act as his
principal's alter ego . . ").
151. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.02 cmt. g (2006).
152. I thank Deborah DeMott for pointing this out.
153. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958).
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principal's conduct for relevant cues as to how to act.154
According to the Restatement, interpretation is called for
regardless of whether the fiduciary is acting under explicit
written instructions, a general directive, or has simply been
appointed to a fiduciary position and received no guidance
whatsoever, such as a court appointed attorney or a new
employee in a large organization.155
The principal's directive-even one that appears clear
on its face-may raise ambiguities that could result in the
fiduciary interpreting the instructions differently from what
the principal intended. 15 6 The instructions, for example,
may be clear, but incomplete, or the agent may understand
the instructions to grant discretion. 157 A fiduciary must
interpret the principal's instructions in a reasonable
manner to further the principal's purposes of which the
agent is or should be aware at the time of acting. According
to the comments in the Restatement, "[t]he agent's
fiduciary duty to the principal obliges the agent to interpret
the principal's manifestations so as to infer, in a reasonable
manner, what the principal desires to be done in light of
facts of which the agent has notice at the time of acting."'158
Under this view, the fiduciary is not free to take advantage
of loopholes or ambiguities contained in the principal's
directive to promote its own interest or the interest of third
persons. 159
This rule of interpretation-interpreting the principal's
instructions consistent with the adoption of ends-is
justified because it helps ensure that the principal not bear
the risk that the agent will take advantage of ambiguities
in the delegation of authority from the principal to the
fiduciary. The rule of interpretation also saves resources.
Under it, the principal can live without a fully specified
agreement and does not have to concern itself with
154. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.02 cmt. f (2006).
155. See id. But see Dennis Patterson, The Poverty of Interpretive
Universalism: Toward the Reconstruction of Legal Theory, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1, 3
(1993) (criticizing the notion that comprehension of every text or verbal act is a
matter of interpretation).
156. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.02 cmt. f (2006).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See id. § 1.01 cmt. e.
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modifying its instructions to the fiduciary, providing
interim instructions over the course of the fiduciary
relationship, or eliminating contingencies that the fiduciary
could potentially exploit. 160 Instead, the principal has the
comfort of knowing that the rule of interpretation will
govern the fiduciary's conduct-the fiduciary will interpret
the initial instructions to further the principal's ends. The
rule entitles the principal "not to have to wonder about the
fiduciary's motive."' 16 1
B. Imperfect Duty
A positive duty to adopt the principal's ends is not the
way courts and commentators traditionally have formulated
the fiduciary obligation. Indeed, both economic and non-
economic accounts of the fiduciary relationship suggest that
the fiduciary duty is primarily negative. The literature is
dominated by the idea that the fiduciary duty is a device to
address agency costs and constrain fiduciary misconduct,
such as self-dealing. 162 Even the U.S. Supreme Court has
160. See id. In some cases, a detailed agreement may be undesirable
because the fiduciary will decide it can ignore certain items as unimportant or
as inadvertent obstacles to furthering the principal's overarching goal. See id. §
2.02 cmt. f. The rule of interpretation-also called a fiduciary benchmark-is
especially relevant in the case of corporations or other large organizational
principals. The rule simplifies the process by which directions are delivered,
understood, and executed. See id. § 1.01 cmt. e. It eliminates the need to draft
instructions with the specificity that characterizes agreements between parties
operating at arm's length.
161. Smith, supra note 133, at 75 (emphasis omitted).
162. See Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary
Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 915 (stating that "the only general assertion"
about the fiduciary obligation that can be made is that it is a device designed to
control one's discretion); Frankel, supra note 2, at 1224 n.37 ("The main thrust
of fiduciary law is ... to prevent [the fiduciary] from misappropriating another
person's valuables."); Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795
(1983); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. 1
(1975) (asserting the fiduciary obligation is necessary to control the fiduciary's
discretion and avoid conflicts); see also Butler & Ribstein, supra note 1, at 29
(stating that alternative to highly specified contracts is to "constrain the parties
to act for their mutual benefit"); Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary
Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55 (John W.
Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985); Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Judicial
Review of Fiduciary Decisionmaking-Some Theoretical Perspectives, 80 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1, 1 (1985) ("Through the fiduciary device, the law seeks to create a
system of compensation and deterrence to protect the principal's interests
against exploitation which results from that divergence."); Frank H.
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written that the function of the fiduciary obligation is to
constrain the fiduciary's discretion. 163 Control of discretion,
however, is only one aspect of the obligation and accentuating
the negative detracts from the importance of motivating the
fiduciary to further the principal's objectives.
The account of the fiduciary obligation as the duty to
adopt the principal's ends draws on Kant's development of
duties of ethics, and imperfect duties, in both his
Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals164 and The
Metaphysics of Morals.165 In The Metaphysics of Morals,
Kant investigated the Categorical Imperative developed in
the Foundations. At the time he wrote the Foundations,
Kant stated in the preface that it was meant to be
preliminary to a Metaphysics of Morals, which he would
eventually complete. 166 His aim in the Foundations was the
"search for and establishment of the supreme principle of
morality."'167 This aim was a project unto itself; Kant
explained that application of the principle at the early stage
of the Foundations could be disadvantageous because the
appearance of its usefulness could inhibit a complete
investigation of the principle independent of its
consequences. 68 Twelve years later, in The Metaphysics of
Morals, Kant sought to derive from the Categorical
Imperative a comprehensive system of duties. Unlike the
Foundations, The Metaphysics of Morals applies the
Categorical Imperative to derive particular duties. 169
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395,
403 (1983) (explaining fiduciary duties as a constraint on managers to use
sound judgment on behalf of shareholders).
163. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 504 (1996) ("[T]he primary
function of the fiduciary duty is to constrain the exercise of discretionary
powers....").
164. KANT, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 9.
165. KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 9.
166. KANT, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 9, at *391.
167. Id. at *392.
168. See id.
169. The Metaphysics of Morals is a "systematic application of [the
Categorical Imperative], a procedure which implies a patient search for criteria
through which duties can be derived, step by step, from the [C]ategorical
[I]mperative." GREGOR, supra note 9, at xii (discussing Immanuel Kant's
Metaphysics of Morals).
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1. Kant's System of Law and Ethics. The fiduciary's
obligation to adopt the principal's objectives or ends is an
"imperfect" duty in Kant's system. What are imperfect
duties and how are they relevant to the fiduciary
obligation? Kant divides rights and duties into two
systems-juridical and ethical-outlined in the two parts of
The Metaphysics of Morals-the Metaphysical First
Principles of the Doctrine of Right and the Metaphysical
First Principles of the Doctrine of Virtue.170 In the Doctrine
of Right, Kant takes up juridical (or legal) rights, which
regulate external actions and which can be enforced by
external means, such as legal sanctions, independently of
one's moral attitude. 171 In the Doctrine of Virtue, he takes
up ethical duties, which can only be enforced by self-
constraint. 172
If the threat of external sanction, such as a fine or
imprisonment, provides the incentive for a person to
perform an action, the law requiring the action is juridical.
If the law itself, not an external sanction, provides the
reason to perform an action, then the law requiring the
action is an ethical law. A law requiring one to keep a
promise made in contract, for example, is related to an
external action-taking the steps to perform the contract-
and is enforceable by the promissee going to court. The law,
therefore, is juridical. But a command to keep a promise
merely because it is a duty, regardless of other incentives,
is an ethical law. 173
Kant similarly conceived of a broad set of duties, which
he divided into ethical duties and juridical duties. Ethical
duties (or duties of virtue) parallel ethical laws and can be
enforced by internal constraint. Within the set of ethical
duties lies a subset of duties, which Kant calls juridical (or
legal) duties, which parallel juridical laws. These juridical
170. KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 9. Kant distinguished
between juridical laws and ethical laws-two categories of moral laws. Kant
separately discussed laws of nature, not addressed here.
171. Mary J. Gregor, Translator's Introduction to IMMANUEL KANT, THE
DOCTRINE OF VIRTUE: PART II OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, at xix (Mary J.
Gregor trans., Harper & Row 1964) (1797).
172. KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 9 at *379-80 (stating that
"the doctrine of Right ... deals with duties that can be given by external laws,
and.., the doctrine of virtue... treats of duties that cannot be so given").
173. See id. at *220.
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duties, in addition to being subject to internal constraint,
also can be enforced externally, such as through the threat
of sanction. All juridical duties, however, are also subject to
internal enforcement if the external constraint fails and,
therefore, all juridical duties are also ethical duties. 174 One
is obligated to fulfill juridical duties, in other words, not
only because of a possible legal sanction resulting in bad
consequences, but also from the idea of duty itself.175 If the
external legal sanction were lacking, ethics steps in to
require one to fulfill the duty. All duties, therefore, are
duties of ethics because all can be accompanied by an
ethical-inner-obligation to fulfill them.176
2. Perfect and Imperfect Duties. In addition to
distinguishing juridical from ethical duties, Kant
distinguished between perfect and imperfect duties. The
perfect-imperfect duty distinction can be traced to Samuel
Pufendorf and Hugo Grotius, and the historical background
informs the application of Kant's imperfect duties to
fiduciary law. In 1625, Grotius distinguished imperfect
from perfect obligations. In some cases, a person may be
obliged to perform a duty, but no one has a right to compel
performance. Grotius called those obligations imperfect
obligations. By contrast, a perfect obligation arises where
one intends "to convey a peculiar right to another."177
Similarly, in 1688, in his classic work, On the Law of
Nature and Nations, Pufendorf discussed perfect and
imperfect right, stating that one can be owed certain
actions by a perfect right and others by an imperfect right.
While all actions can be "voluntarily given," the difference
between perfect and imperfect right is that when actions
owed by a perfect right are not voluntarily given, one can
resort to an action at law to force the other to provide it. By
contrast, what is owed as a result of an imperfect right
"cannot be ... extorted by a threat of the law." Instead,
174. See id. at *219.
175. See GREGOR, supra note 9, at 69.
176. See id. at 28. A duty to repay a debt is an example. The duty is a
juridical duty because the creditor can force the debtor to pay by resorting to
the courts. It is also an ethical duty because absent the threat of sanction, the
mere idea of duty is a reason to repay.
177. 2 HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 134 (A.C. Campbell
trans., 1901).
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what is owed as a result of an imperfect right is "left to a
man's sense of decency and conscience. ' 178
The perfect-imperfect duty distinction parallels the
distinction between juridical and ethical duties. 179 In the
Foundations, Kant differentiates among four types of
duties: perfect and imperfect duties to oneself and perfect
and imperfect duties to others. 8 0 Kant explains that perfect
duties are narrow and unambiguous. They "permit[ ] no
exception in the interest of inclination," no room for
interpretation.1 8 1 Perfect duties are generally negative-
they forbid actions prohibited by Kant's Categorical
Imperative. And perfect duties owed to others are juridical
duties because their performance (or non-performance) can
be enforced by a third party. One of Kant's examples is
promising to repay a loan knowing repayment is impossible.
A false promise, such as this, suffers from self-contradiction
because the promissor is destroying the very institution on
which he relies-promising-by using it to benefit through
making a false promise.18 2
Imperfect duties are more ambiguous. If a duty does not
prescribe particular actions-if it does not specify precisely
how one should act-the duty is imperfect.18 3 The duty of
benevolence is an example; one should sacrifice a part of
one's welfare for others-but it is impossible to set specific
178. 2 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO [OF
THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS] 118-19 (C.H. Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather
trans., Oxford University Press 1934) (1688). For an historical sketch of perfect
and imperfect duty, beginning in the fourth century, see Joachim Hruschka,
Supererogation and Meritorious Duties, 6 JAHRBUCH FOR RECHT UND ETHIK
[ANN. REV. L. ETHICS] 93 (1998) (F.R.G.).
179. In most cases, the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties
depends on the distinction between juridical and ethical laws. See Hruschka,
supra note 178, at 107. In some cases, however, a perfect duty is only an ethical,
not a legal, duty because it may be enforced only through "inner legislation."
The usual example is the duty not to commit suicide.
180. KANT, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 9, at *421-23.
181. Id. at *421 n.*; see Roger J. Sullivan, The Positive Role of Prudence in
the Virtuous Life, 5 JAHRBUCH FUR RECHT UND ETHIK [ANN. REV. L. ETHICS] 461,
464 (1997) (F.R.G.).
182. The maxim of the action cannot be universalized without completely
undermining the institution of promising itself. See KANT, FOUNDATIONS, supra
note 9, at *422.
183. See KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 9, at *390 (stating that
such laws leave "latitude ... for free choice").
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limits on this sacrifice.18 4 Imperfect duties allow for
flexibility-a latitude not permitted by perfect duties. In a
frequently quoted passage, Kant says: "[T]his duty is only a
wide one; the duty has in it a latitude for doing more or
less, and no specific limits can be assigned to what should
be done." 185
How are duties of ethics and imperfect duties related to
the fiduciary obligation? As discussed, fiduciary duties, like
Kant's imperfect duties, are open-ended; fiduciaries must
act reasonably under the circumstances and are not
expected to be right every time.18 6 But the analogy to
imperfect duties is deeper than the open-endedness of the
obligation and goes to the core of what Kant says about
duties of ethics and imperfect duties. Kant explains that
perfect duties prescribe specific actions or inactions one
must take. Imperfect duties prescribe adopting or
embracing an end, such as the happiness of others, but not
the particular actions one must take to achieve the end. 8 7
Thus, an imperfect duty is a duty to adopt certain aims or
purposes, not to undertake particularized action.
Recognizing fiduciary duties as imperfect duties
uncovers why fiduciary law has bedeviled courts and
commentators for years. If the fiduciary obligation requires
the fiduciary to have an end, enforcing the duty through
external means would be difficult. Although Kant places
great weight on the motive of one's actions,188 no one can
force another to have a motive-to have an end. 8 9 Adopting
an end is an internal act the fiduciary must come to on his
or her own. Thus, the puzzle of fiduciary law is that courts
have adopted an imperfect duty as a legal standard and
184. See id. at *393.
185. Id. Another edition of the Doctrine of Virtue translated by Mary Gregor
uses "the duty has in it a playroom for doing more or less." KANT, supra note
171, at *393.
186. See Clark, supra note 162, at 73 (describing duties as open-ended).
187. MARCIA W. BARON, KANTIAN ETHICS ALMOST WITHOUT APOLOGY 30, 42
(1995); KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 9 at *390.
188. KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 9, at *219, *375 n.*. In the
context of perfecting oneself, Kant writes, "Man's greatest moral perfection is to
do his duty from duty (for the law to be not only the rule but also the incentive
of his actions)." Id. at *392.
189. KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 9, at *381.
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attempt to enforce the standard through external means. 190
Mary Gregor writes that imperfect duty consists of a
"fundamental direction given to the will."191 The
fundamental direction to the will takes the form of the rule
of interpretation discussed above. The direction is to
interpret the principal's instructions in a manner to
promote the principal's ends of which the fiduciary is or
should be aware. The fundamental direction is a framework
under which the fiduciary operates. It does not mandate
any specific action, rather it ensures that when the
fiduciary exercises discretion, it does so in accordance with
190. Although I do not resolve this puzzle here, perhaps one answer lies in
the relationship between the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care. See Arthur B.
Laby, Resolving Conflicts of Duty in Fiduciary Relationships, 54 AM. U. L. REV.
75, 121-24 (2004) (discussing the difficulty of enforcing the duty of care as an
imperfect duty). Under the duty of loyalty, the fiduciary must subordinate self-
interest to the interest of the principal. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 170 cmt. a (1959) (stating that a duty of loyalty is duty not to profit at
beneficiary's expense and not to enter into competition with beneficiary absent
consent); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388 (1958) (stating that a duty of
loyalty is duty not to profit on transactions conducted for principal). In that
sense, the duty of loyalty is a perfect duty, which can be enforced by external
means.
By contrast, the fiduciary duty of care requires the fiduciary to take positive
steps to further the principal's ends. The duty of care is an instantiation of
Kant's imperfect duty to adopt an end. Having a maxim of another's end
requires one indirectly to perform some action, as explained further in the text.
A fiduciary that takes no action at all is liable for breach of duty; corporate
directors, for example, may not "shut their eyes" to misconduct. Francis v.
United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 822 (N.J. 1981); see also Bayer v. Beran, 49
N.Y.S.2d 2, 5 (1944) (explaining that the director's honesty is not sufficient, the
director "may not act as a dummy or a figurehead. He is called upon to use care,
to exercise judgment").
The subsidiary duties of loyalty and care, therefore, form a potent cocktail to
enforce the fiduciary obligation as an imperfect duty. Courts require some
(unspecified) positive acts under the rubric of the duty of care. At the same
time, courts require that action taken not result in either a benefit to the
fiduciary or harm to the principal. Prophylactic rules against negative conduct
help ensure that any act the fiduciary undertakes is performed to benefit the
principal as opposed to fulfilling selfish desires. The trustee, for example, must
take some positive steps to manage the trust account, but any action taken
must benefit only the beneficiaries, not the trustee. See Dodge v. Ford Motor
Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); see also Francis, 432 A.2d at 821 (stating
that specific duties depend on generalized standard of ordinary care). Although
a court cannot require a fiduciary to have an end, it can examine how one would
act if he or she had adopted an end and, as a result, imperfect duties to the
principal effectively can be enforced externally.
191. GREGOR, supra note 9, at 90; see also id. at 23.
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the principal's ends.
Fiduciary law is consistent with the search for whether
fiduciaries are motivated to act in the principal's interest or
whether the fiduciary has some other end in mind. A good
example is Shlensky v. Wrigley,192 a leading case governing
corporate fiduciaries. Philip K. Wrigley, owner of the
Chicago Cubs, famously refused to institute night baseball
at Wrigley Field in the 1960s. The plaintiff, who owned
stock in the corporation that owned and operated the Cubs
brought suit alleging that without night games, losses
would continue to mount.193 The defendants claimed they
were protected by the business judgment rule, which
shields directors' business decisions unless tainted by fraud,
illegality, or a conflict of interest.194
In deciding whether the business judgment rule
applied, the court was forced to assess Wrigley's motives.
Was he out for the corporation or was he out for himself? If
the latter were the case, Wrigley would have a conflict of
interest with the shareholders and the business judgment
rule would not protect him. The court ruled for Wrigley
because it was unconvinced that his alleged motives were
contrary to the best interests of the corporation and the
shareholders. The court explained that the decision to forgo
night games could be justified to ensure the safety of
patrons visiting the ballpark or to keep the neighborhood
from deteriorating, not inconsistent with the company's
well-being. 195 The court even suggested it might disagree
with the board's decision, but disagreement with the board
is irrelevant absent the board's improper motives.
Recent cases in the area of directors' duties emphasize
the proper motives under which directors must carry out
their responsibilities. In the closely watched Disney case,
the Delaware Supreme Court held that the Disney directors
did not breach their fiduciary duties in the handling of the
hiring and termination of Michael Ovitz. 196 The court
restated the conventional presumption that directors of a
192. 237 N.E.2d 776 (Il. App. Ct. 1968).
193. Id. at 777.
194. Id. at 778.
195. Id. at 780.
196. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
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corporation, in making business decisions, act in the
'honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interests of the company."' 197 Note that this formulation is
not a presumption that the action was in the best interest of
the corporation, but rather that the directors honestly
believe that the action was in the best interest of the
corporation. The emphasis is on the directors' belief. What
were they thinking when the action occurred? As another
court put it, the directors' actions are presumed to be
'inspired for the best interest[ ] of the corporation." 98
A duty to adopt an end does not mean that no action is
required; it does not mean that aspiring to promote the
principal's end is sufficient to uphold one's duty. Some
commenters have suggested that the fiduciary duty is
merely aspirational. 199 In The Motive, Not the Deed, Lionel
Smith argues that the essence of the fiduciary duty lies in
the "justiciability of motive. ' 200 Although motive plays a key
role, it is not the only relevant consideration. Some concrete
action is required-ends imply action-although, as with all
imperfect duties, the fiduciary cannot specify the precise
action to be done. In The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant
defines an end as "an object of free choice" the thought of
which determines one's choice to take an action by which
the object will be brought about.201 There is an "intrinsic
connection" between ends and human action.202 Imperfect
duties and obedience to ethical laws require some external
conduct insofar as the adoption of an end implies that some
action must be taken toward that end.20 3 "[T]he adoption of
an end is not merely an idle wish. It must manifest itself in
197. Id. at 52 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
198. Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971) (quoting
Warshaw v. Calhoun, 221 A.2d 487, 492-93 (Del. 1966)).
199. See Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of
Corporate Reform, 29 J. CORP. L. 625, 648 (2004) ("[Fliduciary duty of care, if not
ephemeral, exists only as an aspirational and unenforceable standard.");
Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138
U. PA. L. REV. 1675, 1696 (1990) ("[L]anguage expressing [fiduciary] norms is
aspirational and studiously imprecise.").
200. Smith, supra note 133, at 64.
201. KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, supra note 9, at *384-85; see also
GREGOR, supra note 9, at 86.
202. GREGOR, supra note 9, at 86.
203. Id. at 23.
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action toward the end. .... ,,204
According to Kant, ethics refers to maxims, and only
"indirectly and mediately" to our actions. It is left to our
judgment to decide how we will observe an ethical law. 205
"[W]e need not always be acting toward these specific
obligatory ends; we fulfil [sic] our duty in this regard by
having maxims of promoting these ends-maxims which, as
the circumstances arise, will be translated into action."206
Smith, therefore, stops short of what the fiduciary
obligation requires when he says the fiduciary obligation
"never obliges the fiduciary to act or not to act."20 7
Adoption of the principal's objectives or ends, joined
with the absence of a particular formula for achieving those
ends, is the animating principle of fiduciary law. As one
court put it:
[T]hose [fiduciary] platitudes express something deeper; they are a
judicial attempt to emphasize that the heart of a corporate
fiduciary's duty is an attitude, not a rule. The fiduciary best fulfills
its duties if it approaches them with the attitude of seeking the
beneficiary's interests rather than the personal interests of the
fiduciary, not if it simply tries to follow rules codified from past
decisions. 208
Leading fiduciary cases employ the language of the
adoption of the principal's ends. Although the fiduciary may
have discretion in the methods used to further the
principal's objectives, the fiduciary cannot lose sight of the
principal's goals. In Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., in applying
the business judgment rule, the court overturned Henry
Ford's decision to withhold a special dividend because his
objective in withholding the dividend was not to maximize
profits but rather to raise salaries and lower prices.20 9 The
204. Id. at 103.
205. Id. at 98.
206. Id. at 90; see also Marcia Baron, Imperfect Duties and Supererogatory
Acts, 6 JAHRBUCH FUR RECHT UND ETHIK [ANN. REV. L. ETHICs] 57, 59 n.8 (1998)
(F.R.G.) (arguing that imperfect duty is obligatory only at an abstract level, but
each instantiation of the duty is not obligatory).
207. Smith, supra note 133, at 77.
208. Chiles v. Robertson, 767 P.2d 903, 911-12 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
209. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 683-84 (Mich. 1919) ("His
testimony creates the impression, also, that he thinks the Ford Motor Company
146 [Vol. 56
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Michigan Supreme Court stated:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for
the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be
employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised
in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a
change in the end itself .... 210
This is consistent with Kant's imperfect duties. The
directors must adopt the shareholders' end-profit-which
is the reason the business is organized in the first place. 211
The directors then have latitude in how to achieve that end.
Courts suggest methods by which a board can fulfill its
obligation, but state there is "no single blueprint" to be
followed. 212 The directors, however, cannot change the end
has made too much money, has had too large profits, and that, although large
profits might be still earned, a sharing of them with the public ... ought to be
undertaken."). The irony of the case is that Ford arguably had a strategic
business purpose in mind. The Dodge brothers, who owned 10 percent of Ford,
were planning to start their own company and Ford could have been looking for
ways to foil their plan. Commentators note that withholding the dividend would
cut off one source of financing for the Dodge brothers, or weaken their financial
position so that Ford could buy them out in the future, which he subsequently
did. See, e.g., ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAw 604 (1986) ("Many...
have wondered whether Ford's 'eleemosynary' explanation of the cessation of
special dividends was genuine."); D.A. Jeremy Telman, The Business Judgment
Rule, Disclosure, and Executive Compensation, 81 TUL. L. REV. 829, 867-68
(2007) ("Henry Ford understood that he could not testify truthfully about his
reasons for not issuing a large dividend to Ford's shareholders without
revealing prospective business plans and his concerns regarding the threat of
competition from the Dodge brothers ...."). The court, however, took Ford at
his word and since he said he was pursuing a different end than shareholder
profits, the court ruled against him.
210. Id. at 684; see also Corrado Bros. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 562 A.2d
1188, 1192 (Del. 1989) (stating that interests of fiduciary and principal "incline
toward a common goal").
211. See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAw 678 (1986) (discussing
conventional view that directors and officers have a fiduciary duty to maximize
shareholder wealth). This claim is controversial. See Lynn A. Stout, Why We
Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, at 3 (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law & Econ.
Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 07-11), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1013744 (arguing Dodge v.
Ford is bad law when cited for the proposition that the corporate purpose is
maximizing shareholder wealth). But see Paramount Commun. Inc. v. QVC
Network, 637 A.2d 34, 44 (Del. 1994) (in sale of control context, directors must
focus on obtaining best value for stockholders "and they must exercise their
fiduciary duties to further that end").
212. Paramount, 637 A.2d at 44 (quoting Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567
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itself. Their flexibility is only appropriate insofar as they
exercise it in the choice of means to achieve the obligatory
end.
Dodge v. Ford is also consistent with Kant's view on
how it is possible to violate an imperfect duty. Since an
imperfect duty consists of adopting an end, a violation of an
imperfect duty must parallel the duty itself-the violation
must consist of adopting an end indifferent to, or in
opposition to, the obligatory end.218 In Dodge v. Ford, the
plaintiffs prevailed on one claim because they could show
Ford adopted a maxim of indifference toward the
corporation and its shareholders. Ford may have been
concerned with employees or consumers, but he was
indifferent to the shareholders' ends.
III. ADOPTION OF ENDS IN FIDUCIARY LAW
Contractual scholars analyzing fiduciary cases try to
explain them through contractual methods. Part I
demonstrated that the contractual approach has
limitations; Part II put forth an alternative explanation
based on the duty to adopt the principal's objectives or ends;
this Part shows that leading fiduciary cases can be better
explained through viewing the fiduciary duty in this way.
In fiduciary cases, courts are concerned with how a
fiduciary would behave if he adopted the principal's ends.
Viewing the fiduciary duty through this lens better explains
leading cases in the fiduciary area. In addition, Part I
explained that the contractual account is both over- and
under-inclusive and, therefore, not a robust descriptive
theory of the fiduciary relationship. I used examples such
as lawyers, auditors, stockbrokers, and investment advisors
for support. Later in this Part, I revisit those examples and
show how my account of the fiduciary relationship better
explains rules distinguishing fiduciaries from non-
fiduciaries.
A.2d 1279, 1286-87 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989)).
213. See GREGOR, supra note 9, at 100.
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A. Meinhard v. Salmon 214
One of the lingering questions presented by Meinhard
is whether Salmon could have satisfied Cardozo merely by
disclosing the new opportunity presented by Gerry.2 15
Cardozo seems most troubled by Salmon's failure to disclose
the opportunity because silence precluded Meinhard from
any chance to compete.2 16 One view of the case is that
disclosure, which is really all Cardozo was looking for, is
consistent with a contractual approach because disclosure
would have allowed both parties to bid for the asset, which
would have wound up in the hands of the coadventurer who
valued it most.217
Disclosure in this case, however, can better be viewed
as a condition to Salmon's adopting Meinhard's ends.
Disclosure goes beyond what contracting parties at arm's
length could demand of one another. Absent the fiduciary
relationship, Salmon may have been justified in remaining
silent about the new lease. Cardozo's required disclosure is
not what one would expect in the case of most contracting
parties because such parties may stay silent. 218 The duty of
disclosure goes beyond what a contractual approach would
call for. Salmon's disclosure to Meinhard would promote
Meinhard's ends because disclosure would have allowed
Meinhard to evaluate Salmon's own goals or objectives to
214. 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
215. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract, supra note 1, at 439.
216. Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 547 ("He might have warned Meinhard that the
plan had been submitted, and that either would be free to compete for the
award. . . . The trouble about [Salmon's] conduct is that he excluded his
coadventurer from any chance to compete . . . ."); id. at 548 ("A managing
coadventurer appropriating the benefit of such a lease without warning to his
partner might fairly expect to be reproached with conduct that was underhand,
or lacking, to say the least, in reasonable candor .... ").
217. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract, supra note 1, at 440 ("Cardozo
conjectures that Meinhard would have bought an interest or made a better
bid ....").
218. See Libby v. L. J. Corp., 247 F.2d 78, 82 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ("This
fiduciary relationship precludes one member of the venture from purchasing or
otherwise dealing with the property involved in the venture without a full
disclosure to his associates .... Where one of the members acts as 'captain' or
'manager' of the venture the necessity for a full disclosure becomes more acute
and rests more heavily on him.").
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ensure they are consistent with Meinhard's. 219 If a principal
determines a fiduciary no longer has the principal's
interests in mind, the principal may terminate or
renegotiate the relationship.
Moreover, in some passages, Cardozo strongly
suggested that disclosure would not have sufficed. "Not
honesty alone" is the standard of behavior for Salmon,
implying that Salmon had to do more than merely disclose
the opportunity to Meinhard. 220 Cardozo writes that
Salmon had to renounce "thought of self ... however hard
the abnegation."221 Cardozo's canonical text that honesty
itself is not sufficient suggests that Salmon had to allow
Meinhard to participate in the new lease transaction; he
had to include Meinhard in the arrangement regardless of
disclosure.222
Finally, the remedy Cardozo imposes is that of
constructive trust.223 The remedy is significant because a
constructive trust, unlike an express trust, is a judicially
crafted remedy based not on the intentions of the parties,
but rather on the argument that the person holding title to
property would profit by a wrong or be unjustly enriched if
permitted to keep it.224 Cardozo wrote that a constructive
trust is a remedial device through which one places the
interests of others before one's self-interest. 225 Thus,
Cardozo's remedy is one where Salmon must adopt
Meinhard's ends as opposed to his own.
219. Mitchell, supra note 124, at 193 ("[Wie create disclosure requirements
so that persons dependent upon corporate fiduciaries can evaluate their goals
and monitor their activities.").
220. Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 546.
221. Id. at 548.
222. Id. at 546; see Barry E. Adler, The Accidental Agent, 2005 U. ILL. L.
REV. 65, 67 (stating that Meinhard stands for proposition that valuable
opportunity is a profit partners agreed to share); Claire Moore Dickerson,
Equilibrium Destabilized: Fiduciary Duties Under the Uniform Limited
Liability Company Act, 25 STETSON L. REV. 417, 428 n.42 (1995).
223. Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 548.
224. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 160 cmt. a, b (1937).
225. Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 548 ("A constructive trust is, then, the remedial
device through which preference of self is made subordinate to loyalty to
others.").
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B. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch 226
Firestone also demonstrates the emphasis on the
requirement of a fiduciary to adopt the principal's ends. In
Firestone, six Firestone employees sought severance
benefits from Firestone when Firestone sold five plants to
Occidental Petroleum Company and the employees were
denied benefits under a termination pay plan. The plan
entitled the employees to benefits if their service was
discontinued due to a reduction in work force. The
employees were rehired by Occidental and Firestone
claimed no such reduction had occurred. The District Court
granted Firestone's motion for summary judgment using an
arbitrary and capricious standard of review.227 The Court of
Appeals reversed, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari to address the proper standard of review in
actions challenging the denial of benefits based on plan
interpretations. 228
In determining the appropriate standard of review, the
Court rejected the arbitrary and capricious standard
developed under the Labor Management Relations Act
(LMRA).229 The Court began by explaining that ERISA is
drawn from the law of trusts, which guides the Court in
determining the appropriate standard of review. According
to trust principles, a deferential standard of review-such
as arbitrary and capricious-is appropriate only when a
trustee has been given discretionary powers. 23 0 Whether the
trustee has been given discretionary powers turns on the
trust instrument. In Firestone, there is no evidence that the
plan administrator has the power to construe terms or that
determinations of eligibility should be given deference. 231
226. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
227. Id. at 106-07.
228. Id. at 108.
229. The Court refused to import the arbitrary and capricious standard
derived from the LMRA because courts adopted the arbitrary and capricious
standard there primarily as a means to assert jurisdiction over certain suits
brought by beneficiaries of LMRA plans, who were denied benefits. Since
ERISA expressly authorized suits against fiduciaries and plan administrators
to remedy statutory and fiduciary breaches, the reason for the LMRA arbitrary
and capricious standard is not applicable in ERISA. Id. at 110.
230. Id. at 111.
231. Firestone argued that ERISA defines a fiduciary as one who exercises
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The Court fell back on a de novo standard of review. In
making that decision, however, the Court highlighted that
ERISA was enacted to further the interests of employees
and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans. 232
Adopting Firestone's view would leave employees and their
beneficiaries with less protection than they had before
ERISA was passed.233 In order to promote the employees'
ends, therefore, the Court adopted a standard of review
that leaves employees better off than they were before
ERISA's enactment. Absent discretionary language in the
plan documents, the de novo standard of review is one way
to help ensure that plan fiduciaries further their principals'
interests and promote their ends.
One could argue that Firestone suggests that ERISA
law is negotiable based on the ability to vary the standard
of review by altering the discretion given the plan
administrator. First, as pointed out above, the ability to vary
the standard of review by changing the discretion granted to
the plan administrator is not tantamount to making most
or all of ERISA law contractual. The statute has a strong
anti-contractual tilt, providing that "the assets of a plan
shall never inure to the benefit of any employer and shall
be held for the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to
participants in the plan and their beneficiaries .... -234 As
discussed, an ERISA fiduciary must discharge his duties
"solely in the interest" of plan participants and
beneficiaries. 235
Moreover, if the plan documents-and most do-give
the plan administrator broad discretion to exercise its
powers, and the administrator adopts the employees' ends
any discretionary authority or discretionary control with respect to the
management of a plan. Since Firestone exercised discretion and owed fiduciary
duties, it should be entitled to the deferential standard of review. The Court did
not buy that argument. The Court drew a distinction between the power to
exercise all of one's authority in a discretionary manner and the power to
exercise any discretionary authority. And it is the latter which satisfies the
definition of "fiduciary" under ERISA. Firestone could show that it exercised
some fiduciary power, not that all of its power was discretionary. Id. at 113.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 113-14.
234. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 403(c)(1), 29
U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1) (2006).
235. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 506 (1996) (quoting ERISA §
404(a)).
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as its own, just like with the business judgment rule in
corporate law, the courts are loathe to second guess the
means that the plan administrator uses to accomplish those
ends. This is consistent with the description of imperfect
duties provided in Part II. Once the court is convinced that
the plan administrator has adopted the employees' ends,
the administrator has wide latitude in the means it uses to
accomplish the end.
Courts, however, become concerned when there is a
hint that the agent has not adopted the principal's ends.
One scenario when that occurs is when the fiduciary has a
conflict of interest, because, by definition, a conflict -of
interest suggests the fiduciary has his own interests (or the
interests of others) in mind and not the principal's
interests. It is precisely in that case, according to Firestone,
that even if an arbitrary and capricious standard of review
were applicable, the conflict bears upon whether an abuse
of discretion has occurred. 236
Decisions post-Firestone are consistent with a
requirement of an ERISA fiduciary to adopt the ends of
plan participants. Under Firestone, a conflict results in a
less deferential standard of review.23 7 Courts worry about
conflicts of interest because it is in those cases that the
fiduciary is less likely to adopt the ends of the plan
participants and pursue its own ends instead. In conflict
situations, some courts adopt a sliding scale approach with
respect to the standard of review: the worse the conflict, the
less deference the fiduciary receives.238
Other courts use a burden-shifting approach. The court
determines de novo if the decision was wrong. If it was
wrong, and if a conflict exists, the burden shifts to the
administrator. 239 An example is Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue
236. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §
187, cmt. d (1959)). The significance of the conflict on judicial review will likely
be addressed by the Supreme Court soon. See supra note 94.
237. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
238. See, e.g., Fought v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 379 F.3d 997, 1004 (10th
Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (decreasing deference given to administrator's decision
in proportion to gravity of the conflict); Woo v. Deluxe Corp., 144 F.3d 1157,
1161-62 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1998) (adopting sliding scale standard of review).
239. See, e.g., HCA Health Servs., Inc. v. Employers Health Ins. Co., 240
F.3d 982, 993-94 (11th Cir. 2001) (shifting burden to administrator to prove its
interpretation was not in self-interest).
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Shield.240 In that case, an insurance company was the
decision-maker for benefits to be paid out of the insurance
company's assets and, therefore, its fiduciary role was in
"perpetual conflict" with its bottom line.241 The court held
that although the arbitrary and capricious standard was
applicable, the application of that standard would vary
depending on the gravity of the conflict.242 If the conflict is
substantial, the burden shifts to the fiduciary to prove its
interpretation of the plan was not motivated by self-
interest. 243 Thus, although a plan fiduciary can operate
under a conflict of interest, the conflict triggers a new rule
that the area. of discretion subject to a deferential standard
of review will be limited to decisions where the fiduciary
can show it operated "exclusively in the interests of the
plan participants and beneficiaries. ' 244 Once again, the
court adopted the language of pursuing the principal's ends
to clarify its position. Even a very broad delegation of
discretion to a fiduciary is "bounded by the limitation that
the fiduciary cannot act from a motive other than the
accomplishment of the purposes of the trust. ' 245 This is the
language of ends.
C. The Business Judgment Rule in Corporate Law
Understanding the fiduciary duty as a duty to adopt the
principal's ends also helps explain the business judgment
rule, a central feature of corporate law. The businessjudgment rule is "a presumption that in making a business
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed
basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action
taken was in the best interests of the company. ' 246 There
are several explanations for the business judgment rule.
One is that courts are not business experts and lack the
awareness of the range of factors that go into business
240. 898 F.2d 1556 (11th Cir. 1990).
241. Id. at 1561.
242. Id. at 1563-64.
243. Id. at 1566.
244. Id. at 1568.
245. Id. at 1566.
246. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); see BAINBRIDGE, supra
note 27, at 241-42.
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decisions. 247 That explanation, however, is inadequate
because courts do not shy from making "expert" decisions in
other contexts and, occasionally, in business law cases.248
Another explanation is that judicial controls on board
behavior merely duplicate market controls and are
therefore unnecessary. There is no reason to believe,
however, that duplicate controls are not useful particularly
when markets fail.249 A third explanation is the business
judgment rule serves to bolster the board's authority to take
risks.250 That too is incomplete because the business
judgment rule also protects board decisions that are overly
conservative. 251
A better explanation of the business judgment rule is
that it permits the board to adopt an end-corporate
profits-and then provides great flexibility or discretion to
achieve that end. As discussed, when a court applies the
business judgment rule, it gives wide latitude to officers
and directors to obtain the corporation's goals, as opposed to
substituting the court's judgment of what constitutes sound
business judgment. 252  Consider when the business
judgment rule does not apply, namely when directors fail to
adopt the shareholders' ends. The business judgment rule is
inapplicable if the directors' decision was not the result of
deliberations by an informed and independent board.253 If
the board is not independent, if it has its own interests in
mind and not shareholders' interests, the board has failed
247. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 27, at 254; Paula J. Dalley, The Business
Judgment Rule: What You Thought You Knew, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 24,
25 (2006).
248. See, e.g., Zapata v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Del. 1981) (where
demand is excused, court will apply "its own independent business judgment" in
determining whether corporation's motion to dismiss should be granted); see
also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 27, at 254 ("[Blusiness law is not the only context
in which judges are called upon to review complex issues arising under
conditions of uncertainty ... [y]et, no 'medical judgment' or 'design judgment'
rule precludes judicial review of malpractice or product liability cases.").
249. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Independent Directors and the ALI
Corporate Governance Project, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1034, 1073-74 (1993).
250. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 27, at 259; Dalley, supra note 247, at 25.
251. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 27, at 263.
252. See supra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
253. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279 (Del.
1988).
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to make the shareholders' ends the board's ends and the
board loses the benefit of the business judgment rule.
Clarifying when a corporate board has the benefit of the
business judgment rule is one lesson of the Disney case. 254
In Disney, the board did not lose the benefit of the business
judgment rule because the plaintiffs were unable to show
that the board did not act with due care and in good
faith.255 The court discussed three possible categories of
fiduciary behavior that could potentially be bad faith
conduct, and therefore not subject to the business judgment
rule. One can understand the court's determinations with
respect to each category by viewing the relevant behavior in
the context of the adoption of the shareholders' ends.
The first category of bad faith conduct is subjective bad
faith where the fiduciary intends harm.256 In the case of
subjective bad faith, the fiduciary purposefully rejects the
principal's ends and works affirmatively against them.
There is no question that such conduct is in bad faith and
results in loss of the business judgment rule. 257
The second category comprises actions taken without
due care-actions reflecting gross negligence, but with no
evil intent.258 The court stated that such conduct would not
result in bad faith because the duty of care and the duty to
act in good faith are distinct.259 This is consistent with my
thesis. Negligent, even grossly negligent, conduct does not
mean that the fiduciary has rejected the principal's ends.
Although negligent conduct is not consistent with fulfilling
the fiduciary obligation because the fiduciary has failed to
further the principal's ends, it does not constitute a rejection
of the ends. In that regard, such conduct would not result in
bad faith and the business judgment rule would apply.
The third category, which falls between the first two, is
"intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard for
one's responsibilities. ' 26 0 This conduct is not disloyal in the
254. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
255. Id. at 64-68.
256. Id. at 64.
257. See id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 65.
260. Id. at 66.
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classic sense of preferring oneself over others, but it is
worse than mere "inattention or failure to be informed."261
Some mechanism, the court said, is needed to address this
in-between conduct, and good faith is the answer. There is a
deeper reason, however, why such conduct would be
considered bad faith and the business judgment rule would
not apply. Look at the language of the Delaware Supreme
Court, quoting the Chancery Court:
The good faith required of a corporate fiduciary includes not
simply the duties of care and loyalty, in the narrow sense that I
have discussed them above, but all actions required by a true
faithfulness and devotion to the interests of the corporation and its
shareholders. A failure to act in good faith may be shown, for
instance, where the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose
other than that of advancing the best interests of the corporation,
where the fiduciary acts with the intent to violate applicable
positive law, or where the fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the
face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard
for his duties.2 62
This passage is important for two reasons. First, it
highlights the court's emphasis on devotion to the
principal's ends. Second, it articulates a standard of bad
faith that rests on intentionality-failing to pursue the
principal's ends either by pursuing some other end instead
or by failing to pursue the principal's end when the
fiduciary knows it has a duty to do so.
D. Insider Trading
Another area of controversy is the law of insider
trading, which also supports my approach. Insider trading
cases, even those cited by contractual scholars, reject the
methods of contract and adopt a duty-based analysis. 2 63
261. Id.
262. Id. at 67 (quoting In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693,
755 (Del. Ch. 2005) (citations omitted)). A second reason, according to the court,
why this conduct would be treated as a violation of good faith is because section
102(b)(7)(ii) distinguishes between intentional misconduct and acts not in good
faith. Because section 102(b)(7)(ii) only exculpates gross negligence, the
legislature's decision not to exculpate acts not in good faith must mean that acts
not in good faith are worse than intentional acts but not as bad as gross
negligence. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d at 67.
263. See, e.g., United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991),
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United States v. Chestman is an example. 26 4 Robert
Chestman was a stockbroker for Keith Loeb. Keith was
married to Susan Loeb, the granddaughter of Julia
Waldbaum, an insider of Waldbaum, Inc., the supermarket
chain. Keith learned from his wife Susan that Waldbaum
was likely to be sold at a premium to The Great Atlantic
and Pacific Tea Company, and Keith shared this information
with Robert. Robert then purchased Waldbaum shares for
himself and his clients, including Keith, and the Securities
and Exchange Commission and the criminal authorities
sued Keith and Robert for insider trading. Although Keith
settled the charges against him, Robert litigated and was
convicted for insider trading based on the underlying fact
that Keith owed a duty to the Waldbaum family "based on a
fiduciary or similar relationship of trust and confidence. 26 5
Much of the case, therefore, turns on whether Keith owed a
fiduciary duty to Susan and the Waldbaum family when he
disclosed the information to Robert. 266
On appeal, the court determined that Keith owed a
fiduciary duty to neither Susan nor the Waldbaums.
Ironically, it is the reversal of Chestman's conviction for
insider trading that demonstrates the fiduciary relationship
as the adoption of ends as opposed to a contractual
approach. For Chestman's conviction to be upheld, the
government had to show that Keith owed a fiduciary duty
or similar duty of trust and confidence to Susan or the
Waldbaums. 26 7 If fiduciary duties were comprised of duties
implied by contract, then such duties would have existed on
Keith's part: Both the majority and the dissent state that
referenced in Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract, supra note 1, at 440 n.36.
264. Chestman is an interesting opinion to examine for several reasons.
First, it is the result of a rehearing en banc with the participation of twelve
judges. Second, the opinion contains a long discussion of the nature of the
fiduciary relationship and fiduciary duties, and the court even states it "must
ascertain the characteristics of a fiduciary relationship." Chestman, 947 F.2d at
567-68. Finally, the decision includes a lengthy dissent, spelling out a different
approach to the problem.
265. Id. at 564.
266. See id. at 570 (explaining that this is the government's theory of the
case).
267. See id. at 568 (explaining that under the misappropriation theory,
there must be a fiduciary relationship or similar relationship of trust and
confidence, and that determination requires ascertaining characteristics of
fiduciary relationship).
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there was at least an implied agreement for Keith not to
share with anyone the information he obtained from
Susan. 268
The majority, however, does not decide the case on
implied contract grounds. Although the majority agrees
that one can at times imply a term of confidentiality, that
implication must be based on something-something more
is required for implication to occur, namely a preexisting
fiduciary relationship between the parties.269 There is a
difference, therefore, between implied terms and fiduciary
duties because implied terms are only implied if the
underlying fiduciary relationship can be established.270
The preexisting relation, according to the court, comes
about when one person relies on another to serve the
interests of the first.271 The fiduciary in other words must
further (or serve) the interests or ends of the principal.
Once that relationship is established, it is possible to claim
the fiduciary received information for the purpose of
benefiting the principal. At that point, the fiduciary has a
duty not to disclose the information to anyone else. The
implied term, however, can only come about after the
underlying duty to adopt the ends of another has been
established.
In Chestman, it is the dissent that leans toward a
contractual approach, which does not carry the day. The
dissent would hold Robert liable for insider trading based
on a fiduciary duty owed by Keith to Susan-a quasi-
contractual duty. Keith's duty according to the dissent is
based on a mutual agreement among family members that
information of the type here cannot be shared with
268. Id. at 571 (explaining that evidence in the case showed past history of
sharing confidential information); see also id. at 579 (Winter, J., dissenting)
(stating that Susan stressed need for secrecy and they respected one another's
confidences in the past).
269. Id. at 571 (majority opinion) ("While acceptance may be implied, it
must be implied from a pre-existing fiduciary-like relationship between the
parties.").
270. Id. ("Keith's status as Susan's husband could not itself establish
fiduciary status. Nor, absent a pre-existing fiduciary relation or an express
agreement of confidentiality, could the coda-'Don't tell."').
271. Id. at 569 ("A fiduciary relationship involves discretionary authority
and dependency: One person depends on another-the fiduciary-to serve his
interests.").
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outsiders. 272 By sharing the information with Robert, Keith
breached the express or implied terms of an agreement with
Susan and the family. Robert knew of this breach and his
conviction, according to the dissent, should be affirmed. The
contractual approach, however, did not persuade the
majority in Chestman.
Contractualists maintain that insider trading cases rely
on contractual methods, such as imputation of terms in
deciding who can trade. In Carpenter v. United States, for
example, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the conviction of
R. Foster Winans, who wrote the "Heard on the Street"
column for the Wall Street Journal, and gave advance
information about the timing and contents of the column to
employees at Kidder Peabody.273 The opinion discusses
confidential information as a "species of property" as well as
the Journal's right in keeping confidential the contents of
the column. 274 The claim is that whether one has a duty not
to trade is governed by who owns the information, which is
property.
These cases, however, do not turn on who is the rightful
owner of property. Rather courts perform a duty analysis
based on the nature of the relationship between the parties.
The duty analysis does not depend on contract, it is prior to
a contract. In Carpenter, like in Chestman, the prohibition
on exploiting information arises as a result of receiving
information after a fiduciary relationship has been
established. 27 The requirement to keep the information
confidential, therefore, is not tantamount to the fiduciary
obligation; the duty of confidentiality is not a fiduciary
term. Rather, the duty to keep the company's information
confidential arises from a preexisting fiduciary relationship.
Earlier, in Chiarella v. United States, the Court
overturned the conviction of a financial printer, who was
272. Id. at 579 (Winter, J., dissenting) ("Such a duty is of course based on
mutual understandings among family members-quite explicit in this case-
and owed to the family.").
273. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
274. See id. at 26.
275. Id. at 27-28 ('[A] person who acquires special knowledge or
information by virtue of a confidential or fiduciary relationship with another is
not free to exploit that knowledge . (quoting Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248
N.E.2d 910, 912 (1969))).
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able in advance of the final printing date to decipher
information about corporate takeover bids.276 The Court
discussed the duty to disclose and stated that it arose "from
a relationship of trust and confidence between [the] parties
to a transaction. ' 277 In discussing the source of the duty to
disclose, the Court stated that it is applicable to corporate
insiders who have an obligation to place the interests of
shareholders before their own interests. Thus, the Court
first looked to when one party adopts the ends of another.
In those relationships-fiduciary relationships-the obligation
to maintain confidentiality arises. Echoing this theme,
Lawrence Mitchell has explained that adopting the client's
ends is prior to the principal's willingness to repose trust in
the fiduciary. 278 In Chiarella, the printer did not owe
fiduciary duties to those with whom he traded and his
conviction, therefore, was reversed.279
E. Distinguishing Fiduciary from Non-Fiduciary
Relationships
Viewing the fiduciary obligation as a duty to adopt the
principal's ends helps explain which relationships are
fiduciary relationships and which are not. Recall the
examples discussed above to demonstrate that the contractual
approach is both over- and under-inclusive. Lawyers are
fiduciaries, but not auditors; 28 0 investment advisors and
financial planners are fiduciaries but not stockbrokers. 28 1
276. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
277. Id. at 230, quoted in United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 662
(1997).
278. See Mitchell, supra note 124, at 193 (circumstances for reposing trust
in fiduciary exist when "fiduciary demonstrates that she understands the
beneficiary's goals, and that she intends to act, and does act, in furtherance of
those goals"); see also Developments in the Law: Conflicts of Interest in the Legal
Profession, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1244, 1265 n.66 (1981) (stating that the fiduciary
model ensures the lawyer, as a fiduciary, will adopt "concrete moral ends" of
client).
279. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232-33.
280. See cases cited supra note 47. See generally Arthur B. Laby, Differentiating
Gatekeepers, 1 BROOK. J. CORP., FIN. & COM. L. 119 (2006) (comparing and
contrasting gatekeepers, such as lawyers and auditors).
281. See cases cited supra note 43; see also SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191 (1963) ("The Investment Advisers Act of 1940
thus reflects a congressional recognition 'of the delicate fiduciary nature of an
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Contractualists point to high costs of contract specification
and monitoring to explain when fiduciary duties arise.
Auditors and stockbrokers, and their customers, however,
are subject to the same high contracting costs as lawyers
and financial advisors, and their clients, yet auditors and
stockbrokers typically are not fiduciaries. Why not?
Let us again look at auditors. A business engages an
auditor to objectively evaluate a company's books and
report the results. The auditor is a check on management.
It does not stand in the shoes of the client or represent the
client in any respect-it lacks all indicia of the role
identification discussed above. 282 Indeed fiduciary norms
are anathema to the notion of an independent audit.283
Auditors are discouraged from developing a long-term
relationship with an audit client, which can jeopardize an
auditor's independence. Securities and Exchange Commission
rules provide that audit partners must "rotate off' an
engagement after no more than seven years-a rule
designed to terminate the relationship before it grows into
one where independence might be compromised. 284 The
auditor's duty, therefore, cannot be described as an
imperfect duty-it does not and cannot adopt the client's
ends as its own. 285 Indeed, if the auditor were to adopt the
investment advisory relationship' .... ).
282. See supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
283. Auditors, particularly those auditing the books of a public company,
owe fidelity to the public, not the client. In the Arthur Young case, the Supreme
Court noted that by "certifying the public reports that collectively depict a
corporation's financial status, the independent auditor assumes a public
responsibility transcending any employment relationship with the client."
United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817 (1984).
284. Strengthening the Commission's Requirements Regarding Auditor
Independence, Securities Act Release No. 8183, Exchange Act Release No.
47,265, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,915, 68 Fed. Reg. 6006, 6038
(Feb. 5, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 240, 249, 274) (explaining
that, under new SEC rules, no audit partner can serve on an engagement team
for more than seven consecutive years and lead and concurring partners can
serve no more than five).
285. Although typically not fiduciaries, courts sometimes impose fiduciary
duties on auditors and accountants based on factors exogenous to their contract
for services, such as where a relationship of trust and confidence is established
or if the auditor provides advice. See, e.g., Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375,
1381-82 (7th Cir. 1992) (accountant cultivated relationship of trust with client
and held himself out as expert investor, on which client relied). In In re Cendant
Corp. Securities Litigation, the court analyzed whether Cendant's auditor,
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client's ends, it would likely impair its independence with
respect to the client and be prohibited from auditing the
firm's financial statements.
Contrast auditors with lawyers, who are prototypical
fiduciaries. Lawyers provide a different service than
auditors; their fidelity is primarily to the client, not the
public. In the Anglo-American system, lawyers are not
meant to be impartial-they are meant to advance the
client's interests. 286 The lawyer's service is to guide the
client's affairs and achieve the clients' objectives within the
bounds of the law, which is often designed to cabin those
very objectives. 28 7 As discussed above, lawyers identify
closely with their clients. Gerald Postema has explained
that at the client's behest, the lawyer becomes an
"extension" of the legal and moral personality of the
client. 288 Most Anglo-American lawyers learn about the
Ernst & Young, was a fiduciary to Cendant in the conduct of the audit. In re
Cedant Corp. Sec. Litig., 139 F. Supp. 2d 585, 608-09 (D.N.J. 2001). The court
explained that the auditor-client relationship is generally not a fiduciary
relationship. Id. at 609. Where the relationship goes beyond an independent
audit and extends to providing advice, however, a fiduciary relationship may
exist. See id. The difference, of course, is that advice is meant to further the
client's ends, not merely provide an unbiased assessment of the facts. By
agreeing to further the client's ends, Ernst & Young transformed a garden-
variety contract into a fiduciary relationship.
Contractualists might say that in those cases, courts are still implying terms
because the special circumstances where fiduciary duties arise are those where
the parties would have negotiated enhanced duties if they had unlimited
resources to bargain. Like in Meinhard, however, Ernst & Young and Cendant
agreed to the terms of an engagement letter. And Cendant addresses in some
detail why Cendant can simultaneously plead both contract and negligence-
based claims. Id. at 604-06. If the contractualist view were correct, fiduciary
claims would not survive in the face of a detailed contract. What is important is
that courts impose extra-contractual duties, based on the character of the
relationship, not the written contract.
286. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16(1)
(2000) (stating that the lawyer must "advance a client's lawful objectives"); see
also Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198, 206 (1999) ("Unlike
witnesses, whose interests may differ substantially from the parties', attorneys
assume an ethical obligation to serve their clients' interests."); Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) ("The constitutional requirement of
substantial equality and fair process can only be attained where counsel acts in
the role of an active advocate in behalf of his client .... ).
287. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD JR. & ANGELO DONDI, LEGAL ETHICS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 172 (2004).
288. Postema, supra note 141.
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duty of zealous advocacy to the client. 28 9 The U.S. Supreme
Court has noted the "identity of interests" between the
lawyer and client.290 The lawyer, unlike the accountant,
must adopt the client's ends. It must work actively toward
achieving the client's objectives, although no one can specify
precisely what actions the attorney should take to achieve
the client's ends.
A lawyer also has a duty to be independent, but the
lawyer's independence differs from auditor independence.
Geoffrey Hazard and Angelo Dondi explain that a lawyer's
independence from the client entails refusing to assist the
client with violating the law or to render advice that
encourages a violation. 291 It is never in the client's interests
to commit a violation of law. Independence from the client,
in this respect, therefore, is consistent with promoting the
client's ends, and Hazard and Dondi note that
independence in the context of lawyers is consistent with
the duty of loyalty, not opposed to it.292
An example of the lawyer's duty to adopt the client's
end is the prohibition on contractual limitations of liability
for malpractice. Under the Model Rules, a lawyer cannot
negotiate with a client for a limitation on the lawyer's
malpractice liability unless the client is independently
represented. 293 The lawyer, therefore, cannot bargain at
arm's length with her own client in an attempt to maximize
their resources. The lawyer must make the principal's ends
her own ends. In this case, that means ensuring the client
is adequately represented by another lawyer, who will in
turn adopt the client's ends, before the first lawyer can
enter into a prospective limitation on liability.
Understanding the fiduciary obligation as a
requirement to adopt an end also differentiates financial
advisors and planners, as fiduciaries, from stockbrokers. A
broker makes investment recommendations and executes
securities transactions on the client's behalf. Making a
289. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2006) ("A
lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the
client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf.").
290. Cunningham, 527 U.S. at 206.
291. HAZARD & DONDI, supra note 287, at 159.
292. Id. at 116.
293. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h) (2006).
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single recommendation and executing a trade may entail
judgment, but the judgment required is narrow in scope.294
If a fiduciary duty exists, it typically ends when the order is
filled.295 The broker, therefore, is not concerned about the
client's ends and a broker, absent special circumstances, is
generally not considered a fiduciary.296
In some cases, a broker will owe a "special duty"-akin
to a fiduciary duty-to provide ongoing advice to a customer
as a result of special circumstances. Special circumstances
include cases where the client is especially dependent on
the broker, such as a customer with limited faculties or one
who is so unsophisticated that the broker effectively
controls the account. 297 In each of those cases, the broker
would be required to engage his special sensitivities and be
aware of the client's ends, and the broker would be
considered a fiduciary.
Similarly, if a customer grants his broker "discretion"
over an account, the rules change consistent with my
approach. A grant of discretion means the broker may
invest on the client's behalf and bind the client to the
broker's decisions without the client's prior consent and
courts hold that if a broker has investment discretion, the
broker must fulfill fiduciary duties.298 In that case, the
294. Under the federal securities laws, a broker can provide some advice to
its customers and not be considered an advisor, subject to an advisor's fiduciary
duties, as long as the advice is "solely incidental" to the brokerage services
provided. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(a)(11)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-
2(a)(11)(C) (2000 & Supp. 4 2004).
295. See Caravan Mobile Home Sales v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, 769 F.2d
561, 567 (9th Cir. 1985).
296. See cases cited supra note 43.
297. See De Kwiatkowski v. Bear Stearns & Co., 306 F.3d 1293, 1308 (2d
Cir. 2002) ("The law thus imposes additional extra-contractual duties on
brokers who can take unfair advantage of their customers' incapacity or
simplicity."); In re E. F. Hutton & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 25,887, 41
SEC Docket 473 at 467-77 (July 6, 1988).
298. See United States v. Szur, 289 F.3d 200, 208 (2d Cir. 2002) ("Appellants
correctly point out that a general fiduciary duty, triggering a duty to disclose,
arises when brokers have discretionary authority over their customers'
accounts."); Liang v. Dean Witter & Co., 540 F.2d 1107, 1112 n.23 (D.C. Cir.
1976) ("[T]he discretion of the broker is always subject to substantive review
under his fiduciary duty of care ...."); Press v. Chem. Inv. Serv. Corp., 988 F.
Supp. 375, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("The crucial factor in determining whether a
broker has been 'entrusted' with particular matters such that a fiduciary
obligation attaches, appears to be whether the broker exercises discretion over
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broker is acting more like an advisor. It has a duty to
consider the subjective characteristics of the client and
adopt the client's objectives as the broker's own.
Under the contractual model, all brokers should be
fiduciaries because the problems of contract specification
and monitoring are present. Brokers, however, generally
are not fiduciaries; they have no duty to adopt the
customers' goals, objectives, or ends. In those cases where
the customer depends heavily on the broker or the
relationship is discretionary, the broker must adopt the
customers' ends and the law deems the broker in those
instances to be a fiduciary.
Investment advisors are different. An advisor analyzes
the client's situation and recommends securities transactions
to the client on an ongoing basis to further the client's
overall investment objectives. Advisors typically disclose to
clients information needed to evaluate whether to establish
a long-term relationship, such as information about the
types of services provided, the nature and frequency of
reports to clients, fees charged, methods of analysis or
strategies used, affiliations with other securities professionals
and attendant conflicts of interest, and a description of the
advisor's education and business background. 299 This is the
type of information the client needs before assessing
whether the advisor can and will adopt the client's ends. It
is no surprise that investment advisors are fiduciaries.
CONCLUSION
The view that fiduciary duties are a response to high
costs of contract specification and monitoring is too broad in
some respects and too narrow in others. Some relationships
are marked by high costs of specification and monitoring,
those matters."). The SEC recently amended its rules drawing the line between
brokers and advisors to clarify that a broker with discretion must consider the
account an advisory account and, absent a relevant exception or exemption,
register as an investment advisor, which is a fiduciary under the federal
securities laws. Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not to be Investment Advisers,
Exchange Act Release No. 51,523, Advisers Act Release No. 2,376, 70 Fed. Reg.
20,424 (Apr. 19, 2005), vacated by Fin. Planning Ass'n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481
(D.C. Cir. 2007).
299. See Forms Prescribed under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 17
C.F.R. § 279.1 (2006) (Form ADV, the Uniform Application for Investment
Adviser Registration, Part 2).
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but they are not fiduciary relationships; others result in
detailed contracts, yet courts impose fiduciary duties
regardless of the contractual terms. Moreover, although
some fiduciary rules can be renegotiated by the parties,
many fiduciary duties are mandatory-and the mandatory
duties are not the trivial type that can be easily ignored;
they lie at the heart of the fiduciary's role. The contractual
view of the fiduciary relationship, therefore, fails as an
explanatory theory.
The fiduciary duty is better explained as a duty to
adopt the objectives of the principal. The requirement to
adopt the principal's ends is a unique type of obligation that
sets fiduciaries apart from other service providers that act
on behalf of another. The fiduciary duty is akin to an
imperfect duty in Kant's system of duties. It is an open-
ended duty that generally does not prescribe particular
actions or omissions, but rather requires the fiduciary to
embrace the principal's goals or objectives and act to help
the principal to achieve them.
Understanding the fiduciary obligation as a duty to
adopt the principal's ends helps explain leading fiduciary
cases that employ the language of ends. In one area of
fiduciary law after another-trusts, corporate law, insider
trading-courts look to determine whether the fiduciary has
adopted the ends of the principal. Viewing the fiduciary
obligation as the adoption of ends also resolves why certain
service providers, like lawyers and advisors, are fiduciaries
while others, like auditors and stockbrokers, generally are
not.
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